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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
Mohamed Mehdi Rahoui 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand 
 
 The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model 
both for academics and practitioners alike. Nevertheless, the financial literature does not accord 
much attention to the ERP estimation issues (Damodaran, 2015).  The first chapter of this 
dissertation gives a summary of the recent literature review on the subject of the ERP. The 
second chapter explores four of the most commonly cited models in literature for estimating the 
ERP: the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model (HMRRM), the Dividend Discount Model 
(DDM), the Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM), and the Sharpe Ratio Model (SRM). The results 
indicate that the estimates of the ERP vary considerably depending on (a) the variable of choice 
for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and the length of the estimation period; (c) and the 
estimation method. The DDM and the FCFM produce estimates for the implied ERP that are 
below the historical estimates, while the SRM produces implied ERP values that are usually 
higher than the historical values of the ERP. The post 2008 financial crisis period produces 
estimates for the historical ERP that are slightly higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates 
for the FCFM. The implied ERP estimates for the three models are more volatile than the 
historical ERP. In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the SRM tend to overshoot the 
historical ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall below the historical level 
during periods of low stock market volatility.  
 
 The third chapter explores the relationship between the expected ERP and 
macroeconomic variables. The results from the four OLS regressions indicate that the 
relationship between the expected ERP and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general 
negative and insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. The results validate the 
Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama. On the other hand, the expected ERP is found to be positively 
correlated with the stock market volatility in times of non-recessionary periods but negatively 
correlated in times of recessionary periods.   
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CHAPTER I 
ITRODUCTIO 
 
The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model both for 
academics and practitioners alike. The prediction of the ERP has strong repercussions on the 
estimation of the cost of capital for firms. It is an important determinant of the measure of risk 
aversion and by consequence the asset allocation decisions for investors. Its magnitude affects 
the consumption and saving decisions of households and governments’ expenditures. Its 
importance has far-reaching implications for the strength of the economy. Hall (2014) argued 
that the high level ERP reduced investments and prevented hiring post 2008 financial crisis. 
Kuehn, Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013) concluded that the ERP is countercyclical and tied to 
fluctuations in the labor market.  
 
Theoretically, the ERP is the return on equity in excess of the risk-free rate. Since future equity 
market returns are not discernible at the current time, it is the expected ERP that investors are 
concerned with. As intuitive as the concept of ERP seems, in practice it does present a number of 
challenges.  
 
VARIATIO I EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
Among academics, there are striking differences to what the ERP value actually is. Values vary 
from as low as 2 percent to as high as 13 percent (Welch, 2000). According to Damodaran 
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(2013), the wide variation in the estimates of the ERP could be explained by variation in sample 
period, variation in variables measurement, and variation in measurement techniques. 
 
Variation in Sample Period 
 
The questions that academics face is how far back in time one should go to estimate the ERP. 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2005) go as far back as 1792 to estimate an ERP of 3.76 percent 
between 1792 and 1925. Ibbotson Associates (2011) estimates go as far back as 1926. Other 
academics consider much shorter time periods ranging from thirty, twenty, or even ten years to 
estimate the ERP. Both sides have their rationales in selecting the time periods. Proponents of 
the longer time periods approach, argue for more data inclusiveness and therefore better 
predictability. However doing so will most likely generate estimates of the ERP that are less 
relevant to today’s investors since market structures change over such a long period of time. In 
addition, data from earlier periods are much less reliable compared to more recent periods.  On 
the other side, proponents of the shorter time periods approach argue that investors’ risk aversion 
changes over time in relation to economic conditions and therefore shorter time periods will 
yield a more updated and adequate estimates of the ERP that are more aligned with the investors’ 
risk aversion. Nonetheless, the disadvantage of such shorter time period approach is an increase 
in data volatility and therefore higher standard errors associated with the ERP estimates. 
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Variation in Variables Measurement 
 
The ERP is the difference between the return on equities and the risk free rate. Whereas, the S&P 
500 composite price index is often chosen as the market index that approximates for the return 
on equities, first because it is a much broader index and second because it is a market value 
weighted index. There is a debate among academics to what class of security better approximates 
for the risk free rate. A good number of academics use the Treasury bill yield as the risk free 
rate, while others use the Treasury bond yield. Those who favor the use of the Treasury bill do so 
because it is free from price risk, while the Treasury bond has a longer maturity period and 
therefore changes in interest rates can affect its value over time.  Even if this argument does 
make sense over a single investment period, it does ignore the reinvestment risk associated with 
rolling over investment in Treasury bill over longer periods (Damodaran 2008). Conversely, 
individuals who invest for their retirement do so over a long period of time and therefore they are 
more likely to select the Treasury bond as the risk free rate to better approximate for the risk free 
used to compute the expected return on their investment.    
 
Even if academics do agree on the nature of the risk free rate, they still have to find a consensus 
on whether to use a real or nominal risk free rate to calculate the ERP. The obvious argument is 
that since long term return on equity, in most part, is calculated using a real discount rate to 
account for changes in inflation rate, it makes sense to use a real risk free rate to estimate the 
ERP. In this case, the expected inflation rate can be subtracted from the nominal interest rate to 
arrive to the real risk free rate. Recently with the introduction of the Treasury Inflation Protected 
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Security, academics have for the first time access to a traded default-free security that can be 
used to proxy for the real risk free rate. 
 
Variation in Measurement Techniques 
 
The choice between the arithmetic mean and the geometric mean is the next decision in line that 
academics face before they can calculate the ERP. The arithmetic mean is simply the sum of all 
the returns over the period divided by the count of all the returns. Assuming a single period asset 
pricing model and uncorrelated returns over time, the arithmetic mean is the best approach for 
estimating the ERP. This approach loses its ground when we consider the fact that stocks are 
negatively correlated over a long period of time (Fama and French 1988, 1992), and using the 
arithmetic mean in this case will most likely overstate the risk premium (Damodaran 2013). 
Therefore, the geometric mean is a better fitting approach for estimating the ERP over a longer 
period of time and when stocks are correlated over time. 
 
In the second chapter, I estimate the ERP over different horizons while approximating the risk 
free rate to a number of variables with different maturity periods. I consider the 3-Month 
Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10), the 30-Year 
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB30), the 10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security 
constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security constant 
maturity rate (TBI30). 
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ESTIMATIO OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
Damodaran (2015) lists three main approaches for estimating the ERP. The first and the most 
widely used among academics and estimation services such as Ibbotson Associates is the 
historical premium approach. It consists of estimating the expected ERP by assessing the 
historical premium of past returns on equities over risk free assets. The second approach is a 
survey based approach that consists of surveying a sample of managers and investors about their 
future expectation for the ERP. The third approach is what Damodaran calls the “implied 
premium” approach, and it consists of estimating the ERP based on the value of traded assets 
today.  
 
Duarte and Rosa (2015) classified the twenties’ models selected for their study into five main 
approaches based on their underlying assumptions. They are: historical mean of realized returns 
approach, dividend discount models approach, cross-sectional regressions approach, time-series 
regressions approach and surveys based approach. In the next chapter, I estimate the historical 
ERP using four different models: the historical mean of realized returns model, the dividend 
discount model, the free cash flow model, and the sharp ratio model. In addition I test and 
compare the predictability power of each of the four models.   
 
UEXPECTED IFLATIO AD THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
The substantial variation of the ERP over the past two centuries is an indication that it may be 
subject to the underlying macroeconomic forces. Barro (2006) argued that during wartime the 
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perceived increase in the probability of future economic disaster led to a decrease in the real 
interest rates and an increase in actual and expected level of inflation rates. He observed that the 
expected U.S. real interest rates fell during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and more 
recently during the period of 2001 – 2005 following the attacks of September 11 through the 
conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq where the ten-year real rate fell from 3.8 percent to 1.6 percent. 
Moreover, and according to Barro, bonds tend to outperform stocks during periods of economic 
disaster which leads to an increase in the magnitude of the ERP.  
 
Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2007) found a strong correlation between low frequency 
movements in macroeconomic volatility and low frequency movements in the stock market. In 
particular, they noticed that the sharp increase in the stock market during 1990s coincided with a 
move toward lower macroeconomic risk that led to a fall in expected future stock returns and a 
lower ERP after 1990. Their model predicted that the magnitude of the ERP plummets as the 
economy gears toward a state of low macroeconomic volatility.  
 
In the third chapter, I explore the relationship between the ERP and macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, I postulate that an increase in uncertain inflation increases the market risk premium. 
This increase in the market risk premium leads to an increase in the required rate of return on 
stocks, which in turn causes the stock prices to decline. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Song (2007) identified “three major themes in the intellectual history of the equity premium.” 
The first theme emerged with the paper of Gordon and Shapiro (1956) in which they argued for 
the use of the dividend discount model (DDM) to estimate the required return on capital as the 
dividend yield plus the expected dividend growth rate. The ERP can therefore be calculated by 
subtracting the risk free rate from the required return on capital. The DDM was the prevalent 
approach for estimating the ERP among practitioners and academics up to 1976 when Ibbotson 
and Sinquefield proposed a new estimation approach for the ERP based on the historical returns.  
 
The second theme started with the Ibbotson and Sinquefield paper (1976). It consisted of 
estimating the arithmetic mean of the ERP from the historical returns of equity minus the risk 
free rate. The authors operated under the assumption that historical returns are stationary and 
therefore the appropriate length of time from which to estimate the ERP is the longest period of 
quality reliable historical data available. Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s approach dominated the 
practitioners’ estimates of the ERP from the late 1970s up to 1985 when it came under pressure 
from both the DDM and the ERP puzzle literature. 
 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) started the third theme in the intellectual history of the equity 
premium by arguing that ERP estimate based upon Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s approach for the 
period 1889–1978 required an investor risk aversion of 30 to 40 times higher than the prevalent 
risk aversion in the market. In addition the historical ERP estimate for the same period was too 
high to be explained by any of the models describing investors’ behavior at that time. Mehra and 
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Prescott (1985) concluded that either the models were flawed or investors had received higher 
returns than they expected. 
 
Ever since 1985 when Mehra and Prescott made the first attempt to answer the question whether 
the observed ERP is compatible with the theoretical ERP, many more academics have followed 
in their steps trying to resolve what is commonly referred to in the financial literature as the ERP 
puzzle. The attempts that followed can be classified into two main approaches. The first 
approach is the focus of the majority of research and tries to justify the size of the equity 
premium. The second approach focuses rather on explaining why investors have historically 
realized a larger premium than they might have. In the next sections I give a brief summary of 
the literature review for both approaches. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of the literature for the 
ERP. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
  
Justifying the Equity Risk Premium 
 
Ever since Mehra and Prescott introduced their famous paper “The Equity Premium a Puzzle” in 
1985, a large number of studies have attempted to theoretically justify the size of the premium. 
Nevertheless, to this day there is no absolute consensus for a dominant theory over the rest of 
theories. In fact the only consensus in the field is that the ERP is still a puzzle as it was three 
decades ago (Mehra and Prescott 2008). Among the pioneers of the justifying approach are;  
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A Preferences Explanation 
 
An intuitive explanation for the ERP is that a risk-averse investor demands a higher reward for 
bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk. Mehra & Prescott (2008) estimate that historically the 
standard deviation associated with returns on equity is around 20 percent per annum, while the 
standard deviation associated with returns on Treasury-bills is only about 4 percent per annum. 
Therefore, investing in more risky asset commands a higher reward. Such explanation suffers 
from three perspectives: First, the low average debt security is not entirely a risk free asset as 
argued by DeLong and Magin (2009). Second, assuming that a low average debt is a risk free 
asset, the existence of such a high equity premium can only be explained by an extremely and 
unrealistically high degree of risk aversion. Dasgupta (2007) puts the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion to be in the range of 1 to 3, against a coefficient of 50 that is needed to explain the 
presence of the ERP. Third, Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that under the same economic 
circumstances, stocks and bonds reward investors in a very similar way. In fact, they estimated 
that stocks on average should command no more than 1 percent return premium over bills. 
 
A on-Standard Preferences Explanation 
 
Separating Risk and Time Preferences 
 
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991, 2001) formulated an intertemporal utility model that disentangles 
the risk aversion from the intertemporal substitution and allows for a temporal non-expected 
utility to influence the consumer risk behavior. In such a setting the undiversifiable risk 
component of the return is captured by the covariance of an individual asset’s return with the 
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market portfolio, while the covariance of the individual asset’s return with the consumption 
growth rate captures the risk across time periods.  
 
Bansal, and Yaron (2004) presented a model with two main features. First, following on the 
footsteps of Epstein and Zin (1989), their model allows for a separation between the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion. Second, the individual consumption and 
the dividend growth rates are subject to irregular volatility, which captures time-varying 
economic uncertainty. Based on these assumptions, individuals will demand a large equity risk 
premia every time they are faced with a reduction in economic growth prospects or a rise in 
economic uncertainty.  
 
Kallenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) relying on the time preference assumptions of Epstein and 
Zin (1989), studied the effects of transitory and permanent technology shocks on the long-run 
risk associated with an individual asset’s return. Their results are summarized in two parts.  First, 
they show that a model with transitory technology shocks and a low elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution will result in a low volatility of consumption growth and a high price of risk. The 
end result is a large ERP but a highly volatile risk free rate. Second, they demonstrate that a 
model with permanent technology shocks and a relatively high elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution will produce a relative stable consumption growth rate and a high price of risk. The 
end result is a low ERP.  
 
The underlying critique to the time preference models is that they do leave high effective risk 
aversion largely unaccounted for, see for example DeLong and Magin (2007). In addition such 
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attempts are only able to explain the ERP puzzle if they account for an extremely large 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and an economic agent that is implausibly risk-averse (see for 
example Donaldson and Mehra (2008)). 
 
on- Separable Utility Functions or Habit Formation 
 
Sundaresan (1989) is pioneered for developing a model with a utility function that depends not 
only on consumption level at time t but also on the history of consumption up to time t. In 
theory, the existence of large ERP is only justified if the agent faces a large volatility in his or 
her per capita consumption growth or historically the agent has faced a very low volatility in his 
or her per capita consumption growth. By incorporating a habit consumption feature, the agent is 
no longer assumed to be averse to consumption variation but to variations in habit-adjusted 
levels of consumption. Such agent may require a large equity premium even if he or she faces a 
small change in consumption growth. Such variation may explain the ERP puzzle (see, e.g., 
Donaldson and Mehra (2008)). 
 
Similarly, Constantinides (1990) argued that utility is not time separable but exhibits habit 
persistence. He justified the existence of the ERP in the presence of a low risk aversion element 
by developing a model characterized with high volatility in the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption and low variability in the consumption growth rate. As such, a small drop in 
consumption generates a large drop in the marginal rate of substitution that is able to justify the 
observed ERP. 
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Campbell and Cochrane (1999) developed a “consumption-based model” with three distinctive 
features. First, the model assumes that individuals are subject to an external habit formation as 
opposed to internal habit formation. The individual habits are linked to the history of aggregate 
consumption (external) rather than to the individual’s own past consumption (internal). Second, 
the relationship between the individual habits and the history of aggregate consumption exhibits 
a nonlinear trend. The nonlinearity assumption implies that habit is always below consumption 
level and that marginal utility is always finite and positive. Third, the individual habits react 
slowly and gradually to the change in the level of consumption. As such, the Campbell and 
Cochrane model is able to predict a large ERP even in the presence of low long-run consumption 
volatility. The main argument behind Campbell and Cochrane results is that individuals require a 
large premium because stocks do badly in times of economic contraction and not because stock 
returns are correlated with reduction in the individual’s level of consumption or wealth.  
 
Abel (2008) attempted to provide a closed-form solution to the ERP puzzle, first by adopting a 
habit formation model for canonical asset, and second by departing from the assumption of 
rational expectation. The end result was a generalized canonical asset pricing model capable of 
delivering empirical results for the equity premium, the risk free rate, and the standard deviation 
of the risk free rate that are close to the historical data and to the findings of Mehra and Prescott 
(1985). Nevertheless, the Abel model does so at the expense of high risk free rate volatility.  
 
Habit formation models are not anomalies free. Heaton (1995) explained that although the ERP 
puzzle can be explained under the assumptions of the habit formation models, they do so at the 
expense of a highly volatile short-term interest rate which is contrary to the quite low volatility 
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observed historically. Kocherlakota (1996) has shown that while it is true that habit formation 
models are able to explain the ERP puzzle by breaking the direct link between stock returns and 
temporary consumption level, they do so under the assumption that individuals are extremely 
averse to marginal variation in consumption level whether it is internal or external. This 
conclusion was echoed more recently by DeLong and Magin (2009) and  Donaldson and Mehra 
(2008) who asserted the lack of empirical evidence supporting the assumptions of the external 
habit formation model.   
 
Market Structure and Undiversifiable Risk Models Explanation 
 
Limited Capital Market Participation 
 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) explained that only a quarter of U.S. families own stocks. Therefore 
it is not fitting to test for the ERP using aggregate consumption across families who own stocks 
and those who do not own stocks. In fact, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) found that the aggregate 
consumption of stockholders is not only more volatile but also more strongly correlated with 
excess equity return than total consumption is. Nevertheless, the authors admit that their results 
“cannot provide a complete resolution of the equity premium puzzle.” 
 
Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) challenged the assumption of a representative consumer 
which assumes that heterogeneous consumers are able to equalize their marginal rate of 
substitution under the assumption of full-information economy. The authors challenged this 
assumption by arguing that a stochastic discount factor (SDF) calculated as the weighted average 
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of individual households’ marginal rate of substitution with low value of relative risk aversion 
coefficient, as opposed to a SDF calculated as the per capita marginal rate of substitution, is able 
to generate an equity premium that conforms to its historical value during the period 1982-1996. 
The authors also argued that an SDF calculated as the per capita marginal rate of substitution is 
better able to explain the equity premium once the assumption of limited participation of 
households in the capital market is recognized.  
 
Market Incompleteness 
 
Constantinides and Duffie (1996) relied on the joint hypothesis of incomplete consumption 
insurance and consumer heterogeneity in order to construct a theoretical model where the source 
of the equity premium is measured by the covariance of the securities’ returns with the cross-
sectional variance of individual consumers’ consumption growth. The authors argued that the 
joint hypothesis of incomplete consumption insurance and consumer heterogeneity provides an 
explanation for the ERP even without introducing borrowing constraints, short-sale restrictions, 
borrowing costs, transaction costs, or an unrealistic restriction on the net supply of bonds. The 
findings of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) come with the price of restricting the joint 
processes of dividends, aggregate income, and prices under the property of convex marginal 
utility. 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Borrowing Constraints Models 
 
Huggett (1993) suggested that the source of puzzle in the ERP emanates from the fact that the 
average real risk-free rate has been so low, an observation commonly termed the "risk-free rate 
puzzle". The argument is that economic agents are constrained to how much they can borrow but 
they are not constrained to how much they can save. The end result, a low risk free rate is needed 
in order to clear the excess reserves in the credit market.  
 
Transaction Cost Models  
 
Fisher (1994) argued that the equity premium should compensate an investor for the (1) risk 
bearing factor and also for the (2) trading cost incurred. Contrary to the general belief that 
transaction costs and aspects of trading volume are to be ignored in the asset pricing model for 
estimating returns on equity, Fisher (1994) asserted that even in the presence of a negligible risk 
aversion, the gross expected premium should average between 3 percent and 4 percent annually. 
Therefore in the presence of trading cost the ERP carries (1) a risk rewarding component and (2) 
a compensation for trading cost component. 
 
Heaton and Lucas (1995) broadly surveyed the related literature to conclude that models with 
frictions in the form of borrowing constraints, transaction costs, and undiversifiable risk “can 
account for low-risk free rate and in some cases can explain the observed ERP.” Nevertheless, 
the authors were quick to point out that their results suggest that much remains to be explained 
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and that the ERP is far from being completely resolved by the introduction of frictions in to the 
asset pricing models.  
 
Heaton and Lucas (1996) assumed that individuals face systematic labor income risk and 
idiosyncratic labor income risk. Individuals trade in financial securities in hope of dissipating 
these risks. Nevertheless the ability of individuals to trade in financial securities is limited by 
borrowing constraints, short-sales constraints, and transaction costs. In particular the effect of 
transaction costs is amplified by the fact that individuals have to trade often in order to hedge 
against shocks to their individual incomes. The authors argued that the effect of the transaction 
costs on equity premium can be decomposed in two parts. First, a direct effect as a result of the 
gap between the higher rates that the lenders require and the lower rates that the borrowers 
require in order to compensate for transactions costs. Second, an indirect effect related to the fact 
that transaction costs limit the ability of individuals to use financial securities as a mean of 
protection against transitory shocks in individual consumption. The authors find that the indirect 
effect alone of transactions cots is approximately responsible for 20 percent of the observed 
equity premium. Nevertheless, the authors conceded that their results are “quite sensitive to the 
structure of transaction costs and the supply of tradable assets”. 
 
Swan (2002) argued that equity markets are highly illiquid relative to government securities. The 
investors then require a higher compensation rate of return for holding such illiquid market 
securities. According to Swan, the equity premium is no more than compensation to equity 
holders for the illiquidity. Swan constructed a model were the equity premium depends on the 
amortized spread for equity less the amortized spread for Treasury bills after accounting for the 
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transaction costs. The liquidity variable is approximated by the average turnover rate which is 
the ratio of securities traded relative to securities outstanding. Swan’s results indicated that 
annualized security returns decrease at a rate of 0.54 percent for every 1 percent increase in 
equity turnover. The results also demonstrated that the turnover rate for bonds is 25 percent 
higher than the turnover rate for stocks. According to Swan, the liquidity differential between 
bonds and stocks is more than enough to account for the observed equity premium. 
 
Jones (2002) estimated the annual proportional cost of aggregate equity by multiplying the 
annual turnover to the sum of half-spreads and one way weighted-average commission rate for 
trading NYSE. The results revealed that measures of liquidity in the form of bid-ask spreads and 
turnover rates are able to predict stock returns one year ahead. In particular, Jones showed 
evidences that high spreads predict high returns and high turnover predicts low returns. 
Nevertheless, the results fell short of solving the ERP puzzle. In fact, Jones’s results indicated 
that the annual proportional cost of aggregate equity trading can only account for a small part of 
the observed equity premium.  
 
Income Structure Models 
 
Danthine, Donaldson, and Siconolfi (2005) argued that the variation in income shares between 
workers and capital owners represent an important risk factor for the owners of capital and a 
fundamental determinant of the return to equity. The non-competitive labor market as a result of 
political pressure through the tax systems and social forces in the form of trade unions, influence 
the sharing of income in the favor of workers vis-à-vis the owners of capital. The owners of 
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capital are required to share in value added even when their cash flows are limited. This 
“distribution risk”, as called by the authors, is of a great importance to the holders of capital, and 
it even exceeds the usual systematic risk of financial assets. As a consequence, the owners of 
capital require a substantial higher return on their investment that according to the authors is able 
to explain a high equity premium of 3.12 percent and in some instance 7.78 percent with high 
level of dividends volatility. 
 
Guvenen (2005) proposed two assumptions for explaining the ERP puzzle. First is the 
assumption of limited participation in the stock market, where the majority of households do not 
participate in the stock market but have access to a risk-free bond and are able to accumulate 
wealth and smooth consumption intertemporally. The second assumption is related to the 
heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The combination of these two 
assumptions leads to a different growth in wealth distribution among the two categories of 
economic agents (households and stockholders) and over the different business cycle of the 
economy. For example, a positive and persistent technological shock increases the value of 
equity considerably and as a result the wealth of the stockholders. On the other hand, non-
stockholders rely on a gradual increase in wages to accumulate more wealth. Therefore, because 
of the asymmetry in consumption smoothing opportunity, non-stockholders develop a stronger 
desire for a smooth consumption process compared to stockholders. In addition and for the same 
reasons, non-stockholders have to rely exclusively on the bond market in order to avoid high 
consumption volatility and will therefore demand a high equity premium in order to participate 
in the stock market. The analytical results of Guvenen (2005) showed an equity premium of 5.45 
percent compared to the historical figure of 6.2 percent. 
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Beyond One Representative Agent Models 
 
Chan and Kogan (2002) adopt a representative agent model with heterogeneous agents with 
constant individual risk aversion over time but variable across different segments of population. 
As such, the adopted representative agent model will generate an aggregate risk premium with 
countercyclical variation due to the endogenous disparity in wealth distribution across the 
different segments of economic agents. In particular, the segment of economic agents with 
relatively low risk aversion will require a higher ERP than the segment of agents with relatively 
high risk aversion. In fact, relatively “risk tolerant agents” will hold a higher proportion of their 
wealth in stocks compared to relatively less “risk tolerant agents”. Therefore, relatively risk 
tolerant agents are more susceptible to wealth reduction due to a decline in the stock market than 
less risk tolerant agents. By consequence, a decline in the stock prices will result in a higher 
ERP. Empirically, Chan and Kogan (2002) found enough evidence to support their assumption 
of preference heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the authors also concede that “changes in expected 
stock returns in the model are still partly driven by the time varying interest rates.” 
 
Piazzesia, Schneidera, and Tuzel (2007) develop a consumption based asset pricing model where 
economic agents consider housing both as an asset and as consumption good. As such, an 
investor measures risk not only based on the overall size of future consumption but also on its 
uncertain composition between housing as an asset and other consumption. In other words, an 
investor will not only consider the intratemporal elasticity between present and future 
consumption but also will have to consider the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between 
housing and other consumption. This intratemporal substitution mechanism drives stock price 
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down in times of recession by forcing investors to sell stocks today in order to secure present 
consumption. In particular, when the share of housing consumption is low, the recession is 
perceived to be severe and the downward effect on stock prices is accentuated. Empirically the 
model generates a sizeable 3.5 percent ERP with a low and smooth riskless rate with a mean of 
1.8 percent. 
 
Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2008) study asset pricing models with non expected utility 
hypothesis. In particular they consider rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU), disappointment 
aversion (DA) and generalized disappointment aversion (GDA), ambiguity aversion (AA), and a 
general form of reference-dependent utility to contrast assets’ prices in a heterogeneous economy 
composed of two equally wealthy agents but with different first-order risk aversion to a 
homogenous economy composed of a single agent with a wealth equal to the weighted average 
of the utility parameters of the two equally wealthy agents. Their results show that the single 
agent model tends to overstate the equity premium and understate the value of risk free rate by 
100 percent and 20 percent respectively, as compared to the two agent model. The authors argue 
that in the presence of two representatives in the economy, the agent who is more pessimistic or 
risk averse may decide not to bear any risk if he or she thinks that the risk premium is deemed 
insufficiently high. In this situation, the risk premium will be defined primarily by the agent who 
is more willing to take risk and therefore it is a mistake to equate between prices in the 
heterogenous agent model and prices in the weighted average agent model. 
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Behavioral Models  
 
Prospect Theory  
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the authors criticized the utility theory model and its 
inconsistency in explaining choices under risky prospects.  In particular the authors noted that 
economic agents tend to overweigh outcomes that are considered certain in comparison to 
outcomes that are merely probable. This “certainty effect” as labeled by the authors contradicts 
the principle of utility theory where utilities outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. In 
addition, the authors observed that economic agents more often discount components that are 
shared by all prospects in favor of components that distinguish them. They labeled this 
phenomenon the isolation effect which may produce inconsistent preferences away from the 
predictions of the utility theory. The authors then developed an alternative model called the 
prospect theory where they assign values to gains and losses rather than to final assets and where 
they consider decision weights rather than probabilities. 
 
Disappointment and Generalized Disappointment Aversion Theory 
 
Gul (1991) developed an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries that relies on 
countercyclical risk aversion and where consumers are concerned particularly with disappointing 
outcomes. Consumers tend to react aversely when their level of realized consumption is expected 
to fall below a certain predetermined level. The significance of the Disappointment Aversion 
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model is that it retains much of the expected utility theory while being immune to the most 
compelling argument of independence axiom against the expected utility theory. 
 
Routledge and Zin (2010) generalized the Disappointment Aversion model of Gul (1991) by 
introducing a more relaxed definition of the endogenous disappointment outcomes that allows 
for focuses on more extreme outcomes. Such an outcome is considered to be a disappointing 
outcome not when it falls below a certain predetermined acceptable level by the economic agent, 
but rather when it is far below the confidence threshold of the agent. This introduced property of 
the Generalized Disappointment Aversion model, allowed the authors to focus on more extreme 
financial behavior. As such, the authors’ model was able to produce a sizeable equity premium 
measure and a risk free rate with low volatility.  
 
Loss Aversion Theory 
 
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), deviating from the traditional utility theory, the authors 
incorporate two well known ideas in psychology: the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and the evidence of Thaler and Johnson (1990) on the influence of prior outcomes on the 
individual risk behavior, to develop a model capable of explaining the ERP puzzle. The prospect 
theory stipulates that the economic agent is more sensitive to changes in the value of his financial 
wealth from period to period rather than the absolute level or the final consumption outcomes. 
According to the prospect theory, the agent is also more sensitive to reductions in his financial 
wealth than to increases. In addition, the evidence of Thaler and Johnson (1990) indicates that 
prior gains and loses outcomes influence the risk behavior of the economic agent. In particular, 
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an agent may find a fall in the stock market return to be less worrying if it is preceded by 
substantial earlier increase in wealth that makes the investor believe that he is better off 
compared to last period. According to Thaler and Johnson (1990), this finding explains why 
agents who experienced recent gains behave in a less risk-averse manner. On the contrary, agents 
who experienced recent losses tend to be much more risk-averse and tend to shy away from 
investment that they may have considered without these prior loses. This behavior is known in 
the financial literature as the “house money effect”. By incorporating these two concepts into 
their model, the authors relate the high level of ERP to the high volatility of returns which leads 
to frequent losses and consecutively these losses cause loss-averse investors to be even more 
pessimistic. Therefore, a high equity premium is needed in order to convince loss-averse agents 
to invest in stock markets.  
 
arrow Framing Theory 
 
Barberis and Huang (2001), assuming that economic agents are loss-averse and look at utility 
from a narrow framing point of view, studied stock returns in two different economies. The first 
economy was composed of agents that are loss averse over fluctuations of their entire stock 
portfolio in addition to their consumption level. The second economy was composed of agents 
that are loss averse over fluctuations of their individual stocks in addition to their consumption 
level. Their results indicate that aggregate stock returns in an economy where agents get their 
utility from fluctuations in individual stocks as opposed to the entire portfolio, have a high mean 
return and are more volatile and reasonably predictable over time. In addition such economies 
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experience a low and constant risk free rate over time. Their results point to the fact that 
investors’ mental accounting behavior can play a key role in explaining the relatively high ERP.     
 
Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) built on the concept of “narrow framing” that was first used 
by Kahneman and Lovallo in 1993, to develop a utility theory capable of explaining to a certain 
extent the ERP puzzle. The authors departed from the traditional utility theories who define the 
utility of the individual outcome in relation to the total wealth or consumption of the economic 
agent to a more narrowed approach that define utility directly from the individual outcome and 
independently from its contribution to total consumption or total wealth. 
 
In relation to the ERP, the authors argue that in general even though stock markets appear to 
have relatively high mean return, many economic agents shy away from investing in them. This 
non participation stimulates from the fact that economic agents evaluate the outcome of the stock 
market risk independently from their other important risks such as labor income risk, proprietary 
income risk, and house price risk. Based on this observation, the authors argue that a first order 
risk aversion theory that allows for narrow framing is well suited to explain the rejection by 
economic agents to add even a relatively small uncorrelated stock market risk to their other risks 
and therefore generating a large ERP. 
 
Barberis and Huang (2008) surveyed the financial literature for the loss aversion and narrow 
framing approach to the ERP puzzle solving. The authors concluded that models that integrate 
the loss aversion and the narrow framing concepts in framing the investor’s utility function tend 
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to generate a high equity premium, a low and stable risk-free rate and a low correlation between 
stock returns and consumption growth.  
 
Happiness Maintenance Preferences Theory 
 
Falato (2009) expended the standard asset pricing model of Mehra and Prescott (1985) to 
incorporate the concept of “happiness maintenance”. Falato started from the assumption that 
agents who feel happy are more risk averse than agents who feel neutral. As a result of this 
assumption, investing in equity is more risky for an economic agent with happiness maintenance 
preferences. Therefore there is a need for higher return on risky assets in order to induce the 
happy agent to invest in equity. 
 
Explaining the Equity Risk Premium 
 
Adherents to the “explaining approach” on the other side do not attempt to theoretically justify 
the ERP but rather strive to explain why investors have historically realized high premium. 
Among the pioneers of the explaining approach are; 
 
Market Crash and Survivorship Models 
 
Rietz (1988) demonstrated that by accounting for market crashes that are plausible, severe, and 
not too improbable, an Arrow-Debreu asset pricing model is capable of explaining a high ERP 
and a low risk–free returns. Rietz’s explanation is that with the assumption of credible, severe, 
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but unlikely market crashes, risk-averse equity investors will demand a high return to 
compensate for the extreme losses they may incur. These plausible, severe but unlikely market 
crashes led to a historical high equity returns even in the absence of such events. Numerically 
and under the assumption of a severe market crash where output may fall to one-half of its 
normal expected value with a probability of occurrence ranging from 0.0008 to 0.0030, and a 
risk-aversion parameter between 5.30 and 7.05, Rietz’s model was able to generate an ERP 
ranging from 5.92 to 6.38 percent with a risk free rate within the range of 0.73 to 0.89 percent.  
 
Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) observed that out of a sample of 39 countries, the United States 
had the highest real return on equity at 4.32 percent per annum compared to 0.75 percent per 
annum for the entire sample. The authors advanced two explanations for this observation. The 
first is that the high equity premium observed in the United States is a compensation for a higher 
level of risk in comparison to the rest of the countries in the sample. Or, a measure of risk by 
means of volatility indicated that at 16.2 percent volatility, the United States market does not 
experience a particularly high risk when compared with other stock markets. This led the authors 
to conclude that the high equity premium observed in the United States is the exception and it 
does not seem to compensate for higher risk as measured by volatility. The second explanation 
advanced by Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) for the high equity premium observed in the United 
States is that of survivorship bias and a pricing of an infrequently occurring crash.  The 
survivorship bias hypothesis suggests that the ex post observed equity returns in the United 
States may be higher than their ex ante expectation just because the United States stock market is 
a winner and is the only stock market in the sample without any break due to financial crises, 
wars, expropriations, or political upheaval. 
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Starting from the assumption that investors in the stock market tend to overreact to bad news in 
good times and underreact to good news in bad times, Veronesi (2004) went on to test the Peso 
Problem hypothesis which states: because no expected catastrophic event has ever materialized 
during the sampling period ex post realized returns in the United States are high even if ex ante 
expected returns are low. The simulation technique employed by Veronesi validates the 
conformity of the United States stock market returns to the Peso Problem hypothesis.  
 
Building on Rietz (1988) paper, Barro (2006) went on to measure the frequency and the size of 
the international economic disasters, mainly World War I, the Great Depression, and World War 
II, and their impact on stock market returns. His analysis indicated a disaster probability of 1.5 to 
2 percent per year coupled with a decline in per capita GDP ranging between 15 to 64 percent. 
He then constructed a model of the equity premium that extends Lucas (1978), Mehra and 
Prescott (1985), and Rietz (1988) to incorporate rare but probable economic disasters in the 
twentieth century. The model generated an average real rate of return of 0.071 for the G7 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., and U.S.), an average real bill return of 
0.001, and consequently an equity premium around 7 percent.  
 
The effect of macroeconomic variables 
 
Fama and French (2002) suggested that the decline in the discount rates during the period 1951 
to 2000 has produced a large unexpected capital gain and concluded that the average stock return 
for the period in question is a lot higher than expected. In particular, they estimated the expected 
real equity premium to be 3.54 percent per year using the dividend growth model and 5.57 
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percent, 60 percent higher, using the average stock return model for the period 1872 to 2000. 
They attributed the difference between the two measures to the high average stock return during 
the period 1951 to 2000. In fact they calculated the equity premium for the period 1872 to 1950 
to be 4.17 percent and 4.40 percent, only 5 percent higher, respectively for the dividend growth 
model and the average stock return model. In contrast and for the period 1951 to 2000, the 
dividend growth model generated an equity premium of 2.55 percent and the average stock 
return model generated an equity premium of 7.43 percent. As a result of these findings, Fama 
and French (2002) concluded that the observed high ERP during the period 1951 to 2000 is a lot 
higher than expected and that is mainly due to the decline in discount rate during that same 
period which produced a large unexpected capital gain.  
 
Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2007) suggested that the ERP is strongly correlated with the 
low-frequency movements in macroeconomic volatility both in the United States and 
internationally. Specifically, periods of low macroeconomic risk in the form of low consumption 
volatility generate low equity premium and periods of high macroeconomic risk engender large 
equity premium. In particular, the authors suggested that if the economic agent perceives the 
decline in the macroeconomic risk to be sufficiently long-lasting, he or she will demand a much 
lower risk premium because he or she expects an increase in stock prices which explains the 
boom in stock markets in Unites States during the 1990s.   
  
Kyriacou et al. (2006) shed more light on the relationship between the macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the ERP by arguing that over the past 132 years the size of the equity premium 
has been positively related to the rate of inflation. In particular, the high inflationary period of 
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post 1914 resulted in substantially higher equity premium compared to the relatively low 
inflation period of pre 1914. The authors’ simulation model indicated that the average equity 
premium post 1914 would have been only 4.61 percent and not 7.34 percent had the inflation rate 
been zero. The authors theoretical explanation for the observed high equity premium during 
inflationary periods is based on the fact the bonds tend to be a significantly poorer hedge against 
inflation than stocks. 
 
COCLUSIO 
 
In conclusion, there is no one single theory that is better at explaining the ERP puzzle. Different 
theories should be looked at as different pieces of the puzzle that collectively give us a better 
answer as to why the observed ERP differ from the theoretical ERP. Damodaran (2015) stated 
that “the risk premium is a fundamental and critical component in portfolio management, 
corporate finance and valuation. Given its importance, it is surprising that more attention has not 
been paid in practical terms to estimation issues.” In the next chapter, I take the challenge of 
Damodaran and try to contribute to the literature of the estimation of the ERP in practical terms. 
My research falls under the category of the explaining approach and focuses primarily on the 
impact of macroeconomic variables, and principally the unexpected inflation, on the ERP.
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CHAPTER II 
ESTIMATIO OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
DISCUSSIO 
 
Conceptually, the equity risk premium (ERP) is the excess return required by investors for 
holding risky assets.  Reducing risky assets to equity, the ERP is then the excess return of a risky 
stock market portfolio over the risk free rate.  Since future market returns are not discernible at 
the current time, it is the expected ERP that the investor is concerned with. Therefore, 
mathematically, the equity risk premium is simply the difference between the expected return on 
equity and the risk free rate and it can be stated as 
 
        f ntntt RREERP ++ −= )(           (1) 
 
where tERP  is the expected ERP at time t, )( ntRE + is the expect return on equity over the period 
[t , t+n], and f ntR +  is the risk free rate over the same period [t , t+n]. As intuitive as this equation 
seems, in practice it does present a number of challenges. First, investors have to decide what 
constitutes a return on equity and how to estimate future expected returns. Even after reducing 
risky assets to equity, investors still have to decide which stock market index best proxy for the 
market return on equity. Some are price weighted indices, others are value or equal weighted 
indices. In addition, different indices cover different ranges of stocks. Even after having decided 
on the type of index, investors still have to choose among an array of models to estimate future 
expected returns. The capital asset pricing model, the arbitrage pricing model, the multi-factor 
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models, the proxy models, they all represent different approaches for estimating the return on 
equity. 
 
Second, investors have to decide which class of assets is free of default and liquidity risk and by 
consequence is a best proxy for the risk free rate.  Investors have to choose between short and 
long term maturity, nominal versus real and inflation protected securities. Last and not least, 
investors have to settle on period over which to estimate the ERP.  
 
In this chapter I test and compare the following four models: historical mean of realized returns 
model, dividend discount model, the free cash flow model, and the sharp ratio model.  
 
MODELS AD VARIABLES COSTRUCTIO 
 
Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model 
 
The Historical Mean Realized Return Model (HMRRM) is the most widely applied model in 
academia for estimating the ERP, and according to Welch and Goyal (2008) it is the best 
predictor for out of sample estimates. It consists of finding the best linear historical estimates 
under the assumption that excess returns are stationary overtime. Derrig and Orr (2005) 
concluded that Ibbotson data for the period 1926 to 2002 is stationary. The obvious limitation of 
the model is that it presumes that future excess returns behave like past excess returns.  
 
The estimation procedure for ERP under the HMRRM is given by the following equation 
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ERP            (2) 
where tERP  is the equity risk premium at time t, tR  is the return on equity at time t, and 
f
tR is 
the risk free rate at time t. tERP  is often approximated by the difference between return on 
equity and the risk free rate. 
     
     fttt RRERP −=            (3) 
 
The S&P 500 Composite Price Index (SP) is my proxy variable for the market return. The return 
on equity (RE) is the value of the S&P 500 at time t divided by its value at time t-1 plus 1. The 
risk free rate will be approximated using a number of variables with different maturity periods. I 
consider the 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
(TB10), the 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB30), the 10-Year Treasury Inflation-
Indexed Security constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed 
Security constant maturity rate (TBI30). I calculate both the arithmetic and the geometric ERP. 
All data is monthly. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the variables and their sources. Table 2 
provides the summary statistics for the variables.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Dividend Discount Model 
 
The Dividend Discount Models (DDM) use current market value to determine the ERP. As 
stated by Gordon (1962), the value of a stock at time t is nothing other than the sum of expected 
future cash flows for holding the stock, discounted at time t to account for the time value of the 
money and the level of risk associated with the investment. Expected cash flows can arise from 
dividend pay-outs, spin-offs, mergers, buy-backs, etc. In practice, most academics focus on 
dividend pay-outs first because they constitute the bulk of cash flows, second because they are 
readily available through financial disclosure, and third because they tend to grow at a relatively 
constant rate over the long run (Duarte and Rosa 2015). As such we can express the price of the 
stock at any point in time in the following way 
 
     ∑
∞
=
+
+
+
=
0
1
1
)1(t
t
t
t
R
D
P            (4) 
 
where tP  is the price of the stock at time t, 1+tD is the expected dividend at time t+1, and R  is the 
discount rate that accounts for the time value of the money and the level of risk associated with 
future expected dividends. It can be written as  
     ERPRR f +=            (5) 
where fR  is the risk free rate representing the time value of the money and ERP  is the implied 
ERP representing the level of risk associated with future expected dividends that equates the left-
hand side to the right-hand side of equation (5). As such the implied ERP can be derived by 
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subtracting the fR  from the discount rate R that is calculated as the internal rate of return (IRR) 
that equates the discounted value of expected future dividends to the price of the stock at time t. 
 
The main advantage of the DDM is that it generates an ERP that is forward looking implied from 
an equity market value that incorporates changes in the current market conditions. The 
disadvantage is that it relies heavily on earnings and dividends estimates that are based on 
accounting data, not updated frequently, and may not necessarily reflect the market cycles.  
Easton (2007) gives a summary of possible limitations of such models. 
 
For estimation procedure, the DDM of Damodaran (2015) is adopted. Damodaran developed a 
two stages DDM where the dividend growth rate for the first five years is derived from the 
analysts’ consensus estimates of growth in earnings for companies in the S&P 500 index. The 
dividend growth rate in the sixth year and thereafter is assumed to be equal to the ten-year 
nominal Treasury bond rate. The model is represented by the following equation 
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where tP  is the closing price of S&P 500 index at time t. itD +  is the expected dividend at time 
t+i. R  is the expected return on the S&P 500 portfolio. G  is the long term expected growth rate 
for dividend, and it is assumed to be equal to the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate starting 
from year six. Note that for the first five years itD +  grow at a rate equal to the analysts’ 
consensus estimates of growth in earnings for companies in the S&P 500 index.  
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Using the IRR procedure and solving for R  in equation (6) will yield an implied expected rate of 
return. Subtracting the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate from R  will yield the implied ERP.  
 
Free Cash Flow Model 
 
The Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM) adopted in this work is also developed by Damodaran 
(2015), and it is identical to his DDM except that expected free cash flow to equity (EFCFE) is 
used as proxy for potential dividend. The expected free cash flows for investors are calculated by 
adding stock buybacks to aggregate dividends paid. The model is represented by the following 
equation  
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where tP  is the closing price of S&P 500 index at time t. itEFCFE +  is the expected free cash 
flow to equity at time t+i for the first five years. R  is the expected return on the S&P 500 
portfolio. G  is the long term expected growth rate for potential dividend after year five, and it is 
assumed to be equal to the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate. The implied ERP is found by 
solving for R and subtracting out the risk free rate. Table 3 gives a brief summary of the 
variables and their sources for both the DDM and the FCFM. Table 4 provides the summary 
statistics for the variables.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Sharpe Ratio Model 
 
The Sharpe Ratio Model (SRM) is inherited from the portfolio management theory and was first 
defined by William F. Sharpe in his 1966 paper. The ratio measures the excess return of a risky 
portfolio over the risk free rate per unit of risk. It is expressed as 
 
     
p
fP
p
RR
S
σ
−
=               (8) 
 
where pS  is the Sharpe ratio of a risky portfolio. PR  is the expected return on a risky portfolio.  
fR  is the risk free rate, and pσ  is the standard deviation of the risky portfolio. If we assume that 
the Sharpe ratio is relatively stable over the long run, equation (8) can be rearranged to calculate 
the implied ERP.  
     ppfP SRRERP σ×=−=           (9) 
 
Equation (9) states that the implied ERP for the S&P 500 portfolio index is the product of the 
S&P 500 Sharpe ratio by a measure of its implied volatility. For estimation procedure, the VIX 
index, calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), is adopted as a measure of 
the implied volatility. The VIX index measures the volatility implied from options on the S&P 
500 index over the next thirty calendar days. Mathematically it is an annualized standard 
deviation equal to the square root of the risk-neutral expectation of the S&P 500 variance.  
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Using annualized monthly values of the return on S&P 500 (RE), standard deviation of the S&P 
500 (SD), and 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), I estimate a Sharpe ratio ( pS ) of 0.38 over the 
period 1929 to 2015. Using the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10) instead of the 
TB yield, I compute a Sharpe ratio of 0.34 over the period 1953 to 2015. The Sharpe ratio 
estimates are consistent with the academic research estimates of 0.3 over the last fifty years. 
Table 5 gives a summary of the estimate of the Sharpe Ratio value using different risk free rates.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Assuming a constant pS  going forward, the implied ERP is equal to  
     VIXERP ×= PS           (10) 
 
Using the SRM to estimate the implied ERP is not without limitations. Equation (10) depends on 
two statistical measures that have their share of criticism.  Bailey and López de Prado (2012) 
made a valid argument when they demonstrated that the interpretation of the Sharpe ratio may be 
misleading if the assumption of the normality of the returns is broken.  Chow, Jiang, and Li 
(2014) established that the VIX index tends to undervalue (overvalue) volatility when returns on 
the S&P 500 are negatively (positively) skewed. Table 6 gives a brief summary of the variables 
for the SRM. Table 7 provides the summary statistics for the variables. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Results for the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model 
 
Using the HMRRM, I calculated annual historical ERP as the excess RE over TB for the period 
1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015, 
over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015 
respectively. The graphs in Figure 2 depict the arithmetic and the geometric movement of the 
historical ERP over the respective periods. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
It can be seen from the time series plots that the shorter the period the more volatile is the ERP. 
In addition, the ERP tends to exhibit higher volatility at the beginning of the period but later 
stabilizing towards the end. This pattern may indicate the existence of a mean-reversion process 
in the data set over the long term. The graphs also indicate that the historical ERP estimates 
using the arithmetic average are higher than the corresponding geometric average. Table 8 and 9 
confirm these results. The arithmetic means for each time period, independently of the proxy 
variable for the risk free rate, generates historical ERPs that are consistently higher than the 
corresponding geometric means. The difference between the arithmetic means and the geometric 
means varies from as high as 2.66 points (7.09% - 4.43%) for the historical ERP as the excess 
RE over TB for the period 1928 to 2015, to as low as 0.29 points (8.72% – 8.43%) for the 
historical ERP as the excess RE over TB30 for the period 2010 to 2015. The ‘Ibbotson’s 
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Answer’ research paper (n.d.) points out that the geometric average should be applied when 
analyzing historical returns, while the arithmetic average should be adopted for forecasting. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The results from tables 8 and 9 also indicate that ERP varies considerably both across periods 
and with the variable of choice for the risk free rate. For the estimates calculated as the excess 
RE over TB, the ERP varies from as high as 12.71percent for the arithmetic mean for the period 
2010 to 2015, to as low as 6.79percent for the period 1978 to 2015 and from 12.40percent for the 
geometric mean for the period 2010 to 2015 to as low as 4.43percent for the period 1929 to 2015. 
The choice of the appropriate length of time from which to estimate the ERP is not a settled 
argument in the literature. Ibbotson Associates, one of the most widely used estimation service 
for the ERP, uses data going back to 1926. Their argument is that since serial correlation for 
annual ERP is close to zero, “the equity risk premium in one year cannot predict returns in the 
next” (The ‘Ibbotson’s Answer’ research paper, n.d.); therefore, the appropriate length of time 
from which to estimate the ERP is the longest period of quality reliable data available. Figure 3 
graphs the annual historical ERP estimates as the excess RE over TB for the period 1928 to 
2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015, over 
TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015 respectively. 
Table 10 presents the results for the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the 
monthly ERP. The results of the LM test do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Therefore, I conclude that the monthly historical ERP estimates are not serially correlated. This 
conclusion holds regardless of which variable I choose to proxy for the risk free rate.  
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[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Many other analysts use much shorter periods, such as thirty, twenty or even ten years to 
estimate the historical ERP. Their argument is that recent time periods offer more updated 
estimates of the ERP because they incorporate recent changes in the perception of the risk 
aversion among the average investor (Damodaran, 2015). Given the observed greater noise in the 
ERP estimates with shorter time periods in tables 8 and 9, I proceed to calculate the standard 
errors and the confidence intervals for the equity risk premium ERP in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
The results from table 11 indicate that even with the choice of the longest period of time from 
1929 to 2015, the magnitude of the standard error 2.05 percent is significantly large with 95 
percent confidence interval of [2.98% , 11.20%] for the arithmetic average and [0.32% , 8.54%] 
for the geometric average for estimates of the ERP as the excess RE over the TB. Table 11 also 
shows that even with 38 years of data, one cannot be confident that the equity premium is greater 
than zero. 
 
In terms of the variable of choice for the risk free rate, tables 8 and 9 show that the ERP 
calculated as the excess RE over TB30 yield the lowest estimates for both the arithmetic and 
geometric means and across all periods. The results also show that the ERP estimates vary 
overtime depending on the length of the period, indicating that the historical ERP may be subject 
to shifts in interest rates and macroeconomics variables. 
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Results for the Dividend Discount Model and Free Cash Flow Model 
 
As Damodaran (2015) stated; “the problem with any historical premium approach, even with 
substantial modifications, is that it is backward looking.”  The DDM allows us to calculate an 
implied ERP that is forward looking. The model makes three important assumptions. First, it 
assumes that markets are efficient and assets are correctly priced. Second, it uses potential 
dividends instead of actual dividends to estimate the growth rate in dividends in the short term. 
Precisely, Damodaran (2015) used the five years consensus estimate of growth in earnings for 
the S&P 500 index to estimate the growth rate in dividends. Third, the model makes an 
assumption about the long term growth of dividends by assuming that over the long term 
dividends grow at rate equal to the long run growth rate in GDP or the yield on the ten years 
Treasury bond. Damodaran (2015) assumes the latter. The FCFM makes the exact three 
assumptions except that EFCFE is used as proxy for potential dividend. The EFCFE for investors 
are calculated by adding stock buybacks to aggregate dividends paid. 
 
Damodaran (2015) two stages DDM and FCFM estimates of the implied ERP are presented in 
Table 12. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
Figure 4 graphs the implied ERP for the two models. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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Figure 4 shows that the estimates for implied ERP using the FCFM are higher than the estimates 
for the DDM. Damodaran (2015) explained that “the focus on dividends may be understating the 
ERP, since the companies in the index have bought substantial amount of their own stocks” over 
the period 1985 too 2015. Therefore, the FCFM is a better approach for estimating the implied 
ERP since it accounts for a more comprehensive return to investors. The implied ERPs for the 
DDM and the FCFM vary inversely with the economic growth. They increase at times of 
recession and decrease at times of economic expansion. During the financial crisis of 2007, both 
the implied ERP calculated using the DDM and the implied ERP calculated using the FCFM 
increased by more than two percentage points. The implied ERP using the DDM increased from 
2.06 percent at the end of 2007 to 4.05 percent at the peek of the crisis in 2008. The implied ERP 
using the FCFM went from a value of 4.37 percent in 2007 to 6.43 percent in 2008. 
 
Results for the Sharpe Ratio Model 
 
The SRM implied ERP is the product of the S&P 500 Sharpe ratio by a measure of its implied 
volatility. For estimation procedure, the VIX index, calculated by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), is adopted as a measure of the implied volatility. The Sharpe ratio calculated 
using the TB yields a value of 0.38 over the period 1929 to 2015. The Sharpe ratios calculated 
using the TB10 yields a value of 0.34 over the period 1953 to 2015. Table 13 gives the estimate 
of the annual implied ERP using the SRM over the period 1990 to 2015.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
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The estimates for the implied ERP using a Sharpe ratio of 0.38 and TB as a proxy for the risk 
free rate yield estimates that are slightly higher by 0.79 points compared to the estimates of the 
implied ERP using a Sharpe ratio of 0.34 and TB10 as a proxy for the risk free rate. The average 
implied ERP calculated using TB rate for the period 1990 to 2015 is 7.54 percent. The average 
implied ERP using the TB10 rate is 6.74 percent. As shown by figure 5, both implied ERPs 
exhibit the same time series patterns over the period. The implied ERP tends to increase during 
periods of economic contractions and decrease at times of economic growth.  During the eight 
months recession period from March 2001 to November 2001, caused by the collapse of the 
speculative dot-com bubble and the September 11th attacks, the implied ERP increased by 
almost one and half percentage point from its pre-recession value of 8.88 percent to its post-
recession value of 10.34 percent.  During the subprime mortgage crisis from December 2007 to 
June 2009, the implied ERP increased even more dramatically by more than five percentage 
points from a value of 6.63 percent at the end of 2007 to 12.41 percent at the end of 2009. The 
increase in the implied ERP is a testimony of the severe volatility of the stock market and the 
fear that engulfed the minds of investors during the crisis. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Comparison of the ERP Estimates across the Four Models over the Last Two Decades  
 
Figure 6 plots the time series for the historical geometric ERP using the TB rate, the implied 
ERP based on the DDM, the implied ERP based on the FCFM, and the implied ERP based on the 
SRM for the periods 1990 to 2015. Implied ERP estimates for the DDM and FCFM are lower 
than the historical ERP for most of the period. Damodaran (2015) attributes this to the 
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survivorship bias of the United States stock market that causes the implied ERP to be generally 
lower than the historical ERP. For the period beginning with the subprime mortgage crisis in late 
2007, the implied ERP for the FCFM are only slightly lower or even higher than the historical 
ERP estimates. In table 14 I test for the equality of the mean for the implied ERP using FCFM 
and the historical Geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015. The results do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the Mean of the implied ERP for the FCFM is equal to the Mean of 
the historical geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015. Damodaran (2015) 
explained this by the decrease in the interest rates during recession periods, the large drop in the 
S&P 500 index value, and the changes in investors risk aversion.  
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
Figure 6 also shows that the implied ERP estimates from the SRM tend to overshoot the 
historical ERP estimates during times of increased volatility and revert back to the historical ERP 
levels at times of low volatility. This is evident with the dot-com bubble and the September 11
th
 
attacks during the period of March 2001 to November 2001, and more recently with the 
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis that followed during the period of December 
2007 to June 2009. During these two recession periods the VIX index increased by 10.98 percent 
and 87.10 percent respectively. The VIX index also increased substantially during the period of 
strong bull market from 1995 to 2000. Particularly, the VIX index increased more than 30percent 
in 1996 and 1997. The relationship between the implied ERP and the VIX index is well 
documented in the literature. Harvey and Graham (2012) documented a positive relationship 
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between the implied volatility and the implied ERP. The authors explained that an increase in 
volatility is perceived as an increase in probabilities of losses by investors.    
 
COCLUSIO 
 
In this chapter I tested and contrasted the results of four different models for estimating the ERP. 
Results from the HMRRM, the DDM, the FCFM, and the SRM indicate the following: 
• The estimates of the ERP, both historical and implied, vary considerably depending on 
(a) the variable of choice for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and the length of the 
estimation period; (c) and the estimation method.  
• The DDM and the FCFM produce estimates for the implied ERP that are below the 
historical estimates, while the SRM produces implied ERP values that are usually higher 
than the historical values of the ERP. 
• The post 2008 financial crisis period produces estimates for the historical ERP that are 
slightly higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates for the FCFM. This result 
suggests that the subprime mortgage crisis may have resulted in market self-correction 
and in investor re-evaluation of the risk aversion level. 
• The implied ERP estimates for the three models are more volatile than the historical ERP. 
In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the SRM tend to overshoot the historical 
ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall below the historical level during 
periods of low stock market volatility.  
• The choice between historical ERP estimates and implied ERP estimates is a question of 
belief. Models for the implied ERP assume that markets are efficient and securities are 
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correctly priced. Therefore if one believes in market efficiency then implied ERP is the 
best option for predicting future returns. On the other hand, if one is skeptical about the 
efficiency assumption and believes in market timing then the historical ERP is a better 
option.       
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Table 5. Summary of the Sharpe Ratio Estimates 
 
This table provides the summary estimate of the Sharpe Ratio value using the risk free rates 3-
month Treasury bill yield (TB), and 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10) over the 
periods 1929 to 2015 and 1953 to 2015 respectively.  
 
Estimates of the Sharpe Ratio 
  Using TB Using TB10 
Period 1929-2015 1953-2015 
Average Annual ERP 7.53% 5.91% 
Annual Stand. Dev. ERP 19.62% 17.37% 
Sharpe Ratio* 0.3839 0.3400 
  
* Sharpe Ratio = Average Annual ERP / Stand. Dev. ERP 
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Table 8. Geometric Mean Estimates of the ERP for the HMRRM  
 
This table presents the annualized geometric mean estimates of the equity risk premium (ERP) 
using the historical mean realized return model (HMRRM). The risk free rates used for the 
estimates are 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10), 
30-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security 
constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity 
rate (TBI30). The return on equity (RE) is the S&P 500 index return. All variables are monthly 
and the sample period varies with the variable of choice for the risk free rate.  
 
  Annualized Geometric Mean Historical ERP 
Period RE-TB RE-TB10 RE-TB30 RE-TBI10 RE-TBI30 
1929-2015 4.43%     
1953-2015 8.65% 7.34%    
1978-2015 6.07% 4.61% 4.50%   
2003-2015 7.97% 5.78% 5.08% 8.07%  
2010-2015 12.40% 9.54% 8.43% 11.87% 11.03% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Table 9. Arithmetic Mean Estimates of the ERP for the HMRRM   
 
This table presents the annual Arithmetic mean estimates of the equity risk premium (ERP) using 
the historical mean realized return model (HMRRM). The risk free rates used for the estimates 
are 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10), 30-year 
treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant 
maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate 
(TBI30). The return on equity (RE) is the S&P 500 index return. All variables are monthly and 
the sample period varies with the variable of choice for the risk free rate.  
 
  Annualized Arithmetic Mean Historical ERP 
Period RE-TB RE-TB10 RE-TB30 RE-TBI10 RE-TBI30 
1929-2015 7.09%     
1953-2015 10.20% 8.84%    
1978-2015 6.79% 5.32% 5.22%   
2003-2015 9.39% 7.16% 6.44% 9.47%  
2010-2015 12.71% 9.83% 8.72% 12.17% 11.33% 
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Table 10. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the annual ERP 
 
This table presents the results for the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the 
monthly ERP. The null hypothesis; there is no serial correlation. The alternative hypothesis; 
there is serial correlation. Decision; reject the null hypothesis if the probability of Chi-Square is 
less than 5%. 
 
The results of the LM test do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for all ERPs. 
The monthly historical ERP estimates are not serially correlated. 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB  
     
     F-statistic 10.09366    Prob. F(1,1050) 0.0015 
Obs*R-squared 1.031929    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.3097 
     
     Durbin-Watson stat 2.002125    
     
     
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB10 
     
     F-statistic 1.753516    Prob. F(2,746) 0.1739 
Obs*R-squared 0.000000    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 1.0000 
     
     Durbin-Watson stat 2.000461    
     
      
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB30 
     
     F-statistic 1.252137    Prob. F(2,460) 0.2869 
Obs*R-squared 0.000000    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 1.0000 
     
     
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000522    
     
      
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TBI10 
     
     F-statistic 2.266588    Prob. F(2,149) 0.1072 
Obs*R-squared 2.147223    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3418 
     
     
Durbin-Watson stat 2.012565    
     
      
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TBI30 
     
     F-statistic 2.118944    Prob. F(2,64) 0.1285 
Obs*R-squared 0.000000    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 1.0000 
     
     Durbin-Watson stat 1.989860    
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Table 12. ERP based on Damodaran (2015) Two Stages DDM and FCFM Estimates of the 
Implied ERP 
 
This table presents the annual implied ERP based on Damodaran (2015) two stages dividends 
discount model (DDM) and free cash flows model (FCFM) for the periods 1961 to 2015 and 
1985 to 2015 respectively.  
 
  Implied ERP 
Year DDM FCFE  Year DDM FCFE 
1961 2.92% -  1989 3.85% 3.51% 
1962 3.56% -  1990 3.92% 3.89% 
1963 3.38% -  1991 3.27% 3.48% 
1964 3.31% -  1992 2.83% 3.55% 
1965 3.32% -  1993 2.74% 3.17% 
1966 3.68% -  1994 3.06% 3.55% 
1967 3.20% -  1995 2.44% 3.29% 
1968 3.00% -  1996 2.11% 3.20% 
1969 3.74% -  1997 1.67% 2.73% 
1970 3.41% -  1998 1.38% 2.26% 
1971 3.09% -  1999 1.20% 2.05% 
1972 2.72% -  2000 1.65% 2.87% 
1973 4.30% -  2001 1.73% 3.62% 
1974 5.59% -  2002 2.29% 4.10% 
1975 4.13% -  2003 2.12% 3.69% 
1976 4.55% -  2004 2.02% 3.65% 
1977 5.92% -  2005 2.20% 4.08% 
1978 5.72% -  2006 1.97% 4.16% 
1979 6.45% -  2007 2.06% 4.37% 
1980 5.03% -  2008 4.05% 6.43% 
1981 5.73% -  2009 2.60% 4.36% 
1982 4.90% -  2010 2.24% 5.20% 
1983 4.31% -  2011 2.71% 6.01% 
1984 5.11% -  2012 2.47% 5.78% 
1985 4.03% 3.84%  2013 2.03% 4.96% 
1986 3.36% 3.58%  2014 2.24% 5.78% 
1987 4.18% 3.99%  2015 2.46% 6.12% 
1988 4.12% 3.77%  Avg. 3.31% 4.03% 
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Table 13. Estimate of the Annual Implied ERP using the Sharpe Ratio Model 
 
This table provides the estimate of the annual implied ERP over the period 1990 to 2015 using 
Sharpe ratios values of 0.38 (calculated using TB rate) and 0.34 (calculated using TB10). The 
implied ERP is the product of the VIX index by the value of the Sharpe ratio. 
 
 
 
Implied ERP for the Sharpe Ratio Model 
  
  
Using TB and Sharpe 
Ratio of 0.38 
Using TB10 and 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.34 
Year VIX Index Annual ERP Annual ERP 
1990 23.0455 8.76% 7.84% 
1991 18.4002 6.99% 6.26% 
1992 15.4581 5.87% 5.26% 
1993 12.6986 4.83% 4.32% 
1994 13.9457 5.30% 4.74% 
1995 12.3717 4.70% 4.21% 
1996 16.4452 6.25% 5.59% 
1997 22.4310 8.52% 7.63% 
1998 25.5519 9.71% 8.69% 
1999 24.4491 9.29% 8.31% 
2000 23.3646 8.88% 7.94% 
2001 25.9301 9.85% 8.82% 
2002 27.2034 10.34% 9.25% 
2003 22.0908 8.39% 7.51% 
2004 15.4855 5.88% 5.27% 
2005 12.7952 4.86% 4.35% 
2006 12.7810 4.86% 4.35% 
2007 17.4515 6.63% 5.93% 
2008 32.6525 12.41% 11.10% 
2009 31.6612 12.03% 10.77% 
2010 22.5909 8.58% 7.68% 
2011 24.0316 9.13% 8.17% 
2012 17.7959 6.76% 6.05% 
2013 14.2296 5.41% 4.84% 
2014 14.1463 5.38% 4.81% 
2015 16.5741 6.30% 5.64% 
Avg. 19.8300 7.54% 6.74% 
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Table 14. Test for the Equality of the Mean for the Implied ERP using FCFM and the 
Historical Geometric ERP using TB Rate 
 
This table provides Test for the equality of the mean for the implied ERP using FCFM and the 
historical Geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015.  
 
 
Test for the Equality of the Mean for the implied ERP using 
 FCFM and the historical Geo ERP using TB 
Date: 04/04/16   Time: 03:15   
Hypothesis Testing   
H0: Mean of implied ERP FCFM - Mean historical Geo ERP TB = 0 
H1: Mean of implied ERP FCFM - Mean historical Geo ERP TB is different 
than 0 
Result: Reject H0 if probability <0.05  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2015   
Included observations: 9 after adjustments  
Sample Mean =  0.001654   
Sample Std. Dev. =  0.008715   
Method Value Probability 
t-statistic 0.569423 0.5847* 
 
 
* I do not reject the null hypothesis that the Mean of the implied ERP for the FCFM is equal to 
the Mean of the historical geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015. 
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Figure 2. Mean ERP Based on the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model 
This figure plots the time series for the arithmetic and geometric annual ERP calculated as the 
excess RE over TB for the period 1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over 
TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015, over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for 
the period 2010 to 2015 respectively.  
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Figure 2. Continued  
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Figure 3. Annual ERP Based on the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model 
This figure plots the time series for annual ERP calculated as the excess RE over TB for the 
period 1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1978 to 
2015, over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015 
respectively.  
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Figure 3. Continued 
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Figure 4. Annual Implied ERP Estimates Based on Damodaran (2015) Two Stages DDM 
and FCFM  
This figure plots the time series for annual implied ERP based on Damodaran (2015) two stages 
DDM and FCFM for the periods 1961 to 2015 and 1985 to 2015 respectively.  
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Figure 5. Annual Implied ERP Estimates for the Sharpe Ratio Model 
This figure plots the time series for annual implied ERP based on the Sharpe Ratio Model for the 
periods 1990 to 2015.  
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Figure 6. Comparison of the ERP Estimates across the Four Models 
This figure plots the time series for the historical geometric ERP using the TB rate, the implied 
ERP based on the DDM, the implied ERP based on the FCFM, and the implied ERP based on the 
SRM for the periods 1990 to 2015.  
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CHAPTER III 
MACROECOOMIC VARIABLES AD THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
DISCUSSIO AD RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Historically, the magnitude of the equity risk premium has undergone significant changes. 
Campbell (2007) summarized this fact by stating that:  
 
“The equity premium is not a constant number that can be estimated ever more precisely, but an 
unknown state variable whose value must be inferred at each point in time on the basis of 
observable data.” 
 
It is apparent from the data that the value of equity risk premium has undergone a significant 
increase in the 20
th
 century compared to the 19
th
 century. What is not clear though is when the 
shift took place exactly. Fama and French (2002) suggested that the year 1950 represents the 
break point between periods of relatively low and high equity risk premium. They computed an 
equity risk premium of 4.4 percent for the period 1872 – 1950 and 7.43 percent for the period 
1951 – 2000. The authors argued that a reduction in the dividend-price ratio associated with a 
significant capital gain may be behind the significant increase in the magnitude of the equity risk 
premium in the U.S. since 1950. Others, such as Kyriacou et al. (2006), argued that the historical 
upward shift in the magnitude of the equity risk premium happened around World War One 
(more precisely in the year 1914) with inflation (specifically unanticipated inflation) as a 
triggering mechanism.  
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Unexpected Inflation and the Equity Risk Premium 
 
Variation in the Equity Premium with Respect to Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The substantial variation of the equity risk premium over the past two centuries is an indication 
that it may be subject to underlying macroeconomic forces. Barro (2006) argued that during 
wartime the perceived increase in the probability of future economic disaster led to a decrease in 
the real interest rates and an increase in actual and expected level of inflation rates. He observed 
that the expected U.S. real interest rates fell during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, 
and more recently during 2001 – 2005 period of September 11 attacks and the conflict in 
Afghanistan and Iraq where the ten-year real rate fell from 3.8 percent to 1.6 percent. Moreover 
and according to Barro, bonds tend to outperform stocks during periods of economic disaster 
which leads to an increase in the magnitude of the equity risk premium.  
 
Lettau et al. (2007) found a strong correlation between low frequency movements in 
macroeconomic volatility and low frequency movements in the stock market. In particular, they 
noticed that the sharp increase in the stock market during 1990s coincided with a move toward 
lower macroeconomic risk that led to a fall in expected future stock returns and a lower equity 
risk premium after 1990. Their model predicted that the magnitude of the equity risk premium 
plummets as the economy gears toward a state of low macroeconomic volatility.  
 
Smith et al. (2008) tested three leading general models of equity premium namely; the 
consumption-CAPM with power utility model, the Epstein and Zin General Equilibrium model 
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with time non-separable preferences and the habit-persistence model. The authors found that the 
magnitude of the equity risk premium tends to increase sharply in economic periods 
characterized with negative excess returns and that a two factors model with consumption and 
inflation as main variables tend to be the best models that can explain the observed equity risk 
premium both for the U.S. and U.K.  
 
Variation in the Equity Premium with Respect to Inflation 
 
Copeland (1982) argued that in the presence of uncertain inflation, firms may recourse to prices 
increase in order to attenuate the effect of uncertain inflation. Whereas, bondholders do not have 
recourse to such an option and as such they face a higher risk of capital loss compared to 
stockholders in the presence of uncertain inflation. In addition, the presence of uncertain 
inflation makes bonds less attractive under the call-back provision. By consequence, the equity 
risk premium should be smaller in magnitude during periods of uncertain inflation. The author’s 
empirical analysis yielded an equity risk premium of 3.2 percent during the period 1926-1978 
after accounting for uncertain inflation, compared to Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s (1979) equity 
risk premium of 5 percent during the same period. In addition, the author estimated an equity risk 
premium of negative 0.81 percent for the year 1980, which runs against the conventional wisdom 
at that time of a positive equity risk premium and higher return for stocks than for bonds.   
 
Kyriacou et al. (2006) echoed the findings of Copeland (1982) by stating that the equity risk 
premium has been significantly positively related to the rate of inflation over the period 1871 – 
2002. In addition, the relative poor performance of bonds during inflationary periods has resulted 
71 
 
in a much higher equity risk premium in the post 1914 period than before. Numerically, had the 
inflation rate been zero for the period 1914 – 2002, the equity risk premium for the period would 
have been 4.61 percent and not 7.34 percent.   
 
Moerman  and Van Dijk (2010) relaxed the assumption that inflation rates are constant and 
tested the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) for the G5 countries ( France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US) over the period 1975 – 1998 and found that inflation risk is 
statistically and significantly priced in assets’ return.  
 
Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011) empirically showed that expected inflation rates are significant 
and strong predictors of future stock returns in several industrialized countries (Germany, United 
Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, and Japan). In particular, a one standard deviation 
increase in the expected rate of inflation decreases the stock returns by more than six percent 
over the following six months period which will lead to a higher equity risk premium over the 
same period. This negative relationship between inflation and stock returns may be triggered by 
a monetary policy transmission channel that starts by lowering the level of interest rate in order 
to boost output, raise investment activities and by consequence increase stock valuations. 
However, if the monetary policy is also seen as raising the inflation expectations, stock prices 
fall, the cost of capital increases and the equity premium increases.   
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Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation 
 
on egative Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation 
 
The paradigm that stock returns are positively correlated with inflation rate emanates from the 
original work of Fisher (1930) who stated that the expected rates of return on common stocks is 
the sum of the real return on common stocks plus the expected rate of inflation, also known as 
the Fisher Equation.  
 
Firth (1979) examined the relationship between rates of return on common stocks and inflation in 
the U.K. for the period 1935 – 1976 and found evidence for the support of the Fisher Equation. 
In other words, nominal common stock returns in the U.K. tended to be positively correlated 
with the inflation rate. 
 
Benderly and Zwick (1985) provided evidence that in the long run the relationship between real 
common stock returns and inflation is fully consistent with market efficiency and that the rate of 
return on equity is invariant to changes in nominal variables such as inflation. Nevertheless, the 
authors conceded that a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation may exist in the 
short run during periods of disequilibrium where the inflation rate did not fully adjust to the 
growth in money supply.  
 
Titman and Warga (1989) documented a statistically significant positive relationship between 
stock returns and inflation for the period 1979 – 1982 in the U.S. Nevertheless, the authors 
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remained puzzled why the positive relationship holds mainly in the above period. One advanced 
explanation is that the interest rate and the inflation rate were by some means more predictable 
during this period and by consequence more rapidly integrated into stock returns.   
 
Mishkin (1992) reexamined the view that there was a strong Fisher effect in the U.S. during the 
post World War II before 1979 period and concluded that a strong Fisher effect occurs only 
during certain periods, mainly in the long run and when both inflation and interest rates exhibit 
common stochastic trend. The author found no support for the Fisher effect in the short term, 
implying a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation in the short run.  
 
Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) accumulated two centuries of data on stocks, short-term and 
long-term bonds, and inflation in both the U.S. and the U.K from 1802 to 1990 and found 
evidence to suggest that nominal stock returns are positively correlated with both ex-ante and ex-
post inflation over the long-term horizon in both countries.  
 
Du (2006) postulated that the relationship between stock returns and inflation depended both on 
the monetary policy regime and the relative importance of the demand and supply shocks to the 
economy. Empirically, the author found that over the entire period of 1926 – 2001, only the sub-
period 1926 – 1939 exhibited signs of a positive relationship between stock returns and inflation 
that was due mainly to strongly pro-cyclical monetary policy. For rest of the period from 1940 to 
2001, the results strongly support a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation that 
the author attributed mainly to supply shocks. 
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Alagidede (2009) tested the relationship between stock returns and inflation in six African 
economies (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia) and concluded that 
stocks acted as a good hedge against inflation (positive relationship) over the long horizon in at 
least three markets (Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia).  
 
egative Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation 
 
The negative relationship between stock return and inflation is well documented in finance 
literature. Bodie (1976) attempted to address the question of how effective common stocks are in 
hedging against inflation. The author asserted that the answer to his question depends on two 
parameters. The first is the ratio of the variance of the non-inflation stochastic component of the 
real return on common stocks to the variance of unanticipated inflation. The larger this variance 
ratio is the less effective common stocks are in hedging against inflation. The second is the 
difference between the nominal return on the riskless asset and the coefficient of the 
unanticipated inflation. The greater the absolute value of this difference the more effective 
common stocks are in hedging against inflation. Estimates of the annual, quarterly, and monthly 
data for the period 1953 – 1972 revealed that the real return on equity is negatively related to 
both anticipated and unanticipated inflation. The author concluded that a sell short strategy is the 
only way for common stocks to effectively hedge against inflation.  
 
Jaffe and Mandelker (1976) examined the relationship between the returns on common stocks 
and the inflation during the period 1953 – 1971 and found significant negative relationship 
between monthly returns on common stocks and both anticipated and unanticipated inflation. 
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However, when yearly returns on common stocks were used for the period 1875 - 1970, the 
negative relationship disappeared, suggesting that the negative relationship between returns on 
common stock and inflation is one of a short horizon.   
 
Fama and Schwert (1977) tested the effectiveness of various types of assets in hedging again 
anticipated and unanticipated inflation during the period 1953 – 1971. Their findings indicated 
that only private residential real estate was an effective hedge instrument against both anticipated 
and unanticipated inflation. Government bonds and bills were only effective in hedging against 
anticipated inflation. Labor income appeared to have no relationship with both anticipated and 
unanticipated inflation at least in the short term. While, common stocks failed to act as a hedge 
instrument and showed negative relationship with respect to both anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation. Nonetheless, the authors were keen to note that the negative relationship between 
common stocks and inflation accounted only for a small portion of the returns variation and did 
not represent a reason for profitable trading opportunity.   
 
Nelson (1979) used quarterly data for the period 1954 – 1970 and found that U.S. price level is 
very slow to respond to changes in nominal income and that inflation is deflationary, a result that 
the author found to be consistent with a negative relationship between the stock returns and 
inflation rates in the U.S. 
 
Solnik (1983) extended the analysis further by testing the relationship between stock returns and 
inflation in nine countries (U.S., Japan, U.K., Switzerland, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Canada) over the period 1971 – 1980. The results suggested a rejection of the 
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assumption that real returns are independent of inflationary expectations. Instead the author 
found consistent support that stock returns tend to move downwards in the presence of 
inflationary expectations. This indicated that the negative relationship between stock returns and 
inflation is evident not only in the U.S. but also in major industrial countries.  
 
Gultekin (1983) examined the relationship between common stock returns and inflation in 
twenty-six countries using monthly data for the period 1947 – 1979 and found evidence for the 
rejection of the Fisher hypothesis that real returns are independent of expected inflation and that 
nominal returns move on one-to-one basis with regard to expected inflation. Instead, the results 
indicated that the relationship between common stock returns and expected inflation is 
predominantly negative across the twenty-six countries.  
 
Wahlroos and Berglund (1986) used data from the Finnish economy to test the Fisher hypothesis 
that real stock returns are independent of inflation rate. Their results showed a significant 
negative relationship between stock returns and both expected as well as unexpected inflation 
and whether they controlled for real activity or not in their testing model. 
 
Laopodis (2006) looked at the relationship between real stock returns and inflation under three 
monetary policy regimes (Arthur Burns from 1970 to 1978, Paul Volcker from 1979 to 1987, and 
Alan Greenspan from 1988 to 2005) using bivariate and multivariate vector autoregressive 
cointegration specifications. The results indicated that the bivariate model supported a weak 
negative relationship in the 1970s and 1980s, while the multivariate model carried a strong 
negative relationship between real stock returns and inflation in the 1970s.  
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Explaining the egative Relationship between Stock Return and Inflation 
 
Many theories have been advanced to explain the negative relationship between stock return and 
inflation. For the purpose of this work I am going to focus on two of the more plausible theories: 
The Proxy Hypothesis of Fama (1981), and the Risk Premium Hypothesis of Tobin (1958). 
 
The proxy hypothesis  
 
The Proxy Hypothesis theory was first introduced by Fama in his 1981 paper. The basic 
argument of the Proxy Hypothesis theory is that stock returns are not only forecasted using real 
economic variables such as the annual growth rates of industrial production, change in the capital 
expenditures ratio, and change in the real rate of return on capital, but also exhibit positive 
relationships with these variables. Expected inflation is however negatively related to such 
expected real economic variables. By consequence, the negative relationship between stock 
return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship between stock return and 
future real economic variables. 
 
Using monthly, quarterly, and annual data for the post-1953 period, Fama provided numerical 
evidences for the Proxy Hypothesis theory. In particular, the annual results indicated that the 
negative relationship between real stock returns and inflation rates disappears when growth rates 
of money and real activity variables are included in the forecasting equation. Nonetheless, the 
monthly and the quarterly empirical results suggested the presence of a negative explanatory 
power for unexpected inflation over the short term horizon. The author attributed this negative 
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relationship between inflation and expected real return to the unexpected characteristics of the 
money supply during the post-1953 period. 
 
Kaul (1987) analyzed data from four industrialized countries (U.S., Canada, U.K., and Germany) 
to conclude that the relationship between stock returns and inflation varies over time depending 
on the equilibrium process in the monetary sector. In particular, this relationship tends to be 
negative during times of counter-cyclical movements in money, prices, and stock returns and 
positive during times of pro-cyclical movements monetary responses.      
 
Lee (1992) used a multivariate vector-autoregression (VAR) to explore the causal relationship 
between real stock returns, real interest rates, real activities (growth industrial production), and 
rate of inflation during U.S. postwar period of January 1947 to December 1987. He found that 
stock returns explained a very small portion of the variation in inflation in the presence of real 
interest rates in the VAR equation. In addition, inflation was responsible for a small variation in 
real activities with the latter responding negatively to shocks in inflation. These results lead the 
author to conclude no causal linkage existed between the real stock returns and money supply 
growth and between real stock returns and inflation rates. 
 
Gallagher and Taylor (2002) developed a theoretical model to test Fama’s Proxy Hypothesis 
theory using a multivariate innovation decomposition technique over the period 1957 through 
1997. The contribution of the authors is in isolating the demand innovations that are assumed to 
be associated with temporary shocks to real economic variables from the supply innovations that 
are assumed to be associated with permanent shocks to real economic variables. Under these 
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assumptions, real stock returns were found to be insignificantly correlated with inflation in the 
presence of demand shocks, but strongly significantly negatively correlated with inflation in the 
presence of supply shocks as predicted by the Proxy Hypothesis Theory. 
 
Gregoriou and Kontonikas (2010) used data from sixteen OECD countries over the sample 
period 1970–2006 to examine the long-run relationship between stock prices and goods’ prices 
and to test whether stocks’ market investment can provide a hedge against inflation. The 
empirical analysis advocated a positive long-run relationship between goods’ prices and stock 
prices and suggested that stocks hedge against inflation in the long run as predicted by the Fisher 
hypothesis.  
 
The Risk Premium Hypothesis  
 
The Risk Premium Hypothesis has its roots in Tobin’s (1958) paper in which he argued that 
money demand depends, among other things, on the risk aversion of economic agents and on the 
perceived risk of competing assets. In particular, uncertainty about monetary policy increases 
inflation risk. And an unexpected increase in inflation causes the market risk premium to rise, 
resulting in an increase in the required rate of return on stocks. The increase in the required rate 
of return causes stock prices to fall.  
 
Cornell (1983) studied the reaction of asset prices to money supply announcements by testing 
four of the major theories (the Risk Premium Hypothesis, the Expected Inflation Hypothesis, the 
Keynesian Hypothesis, and the Real Activities Hypothesis) that explained why money supply 
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announcements alter asset prices. Results of his tests indicated that money supply 
announcements have an impact on the real rate. However, the author did not go as far as stating 
that monetary shocks affect the real rate, because the change in real rate could be also explained 
by changes in real economic variables as a result of the announcements about the money supply. 
 
Wahlroos and Berglund (1986) used data from the Finnish economy first to test the Generalized 
Fisher Hypothesis that stock returns are independent of inflationary expectations and second to 
test whether Fama Proxy Hypothesis accounts for the negative relationship between stock returns 
and unexpected inflation in case of the rejection of the Fisher Hypothesis. The outcome was a 
rejection of the Fisher Hypothesis with a highly significant negative relationship between stock 
returns and expected inflation as well as stock returns and unexpected inflation. In addition, the 
negative relationship persisted even with the inclusion of measures of real activity into the 
equation. This led the author to conclude that the Proxy Hypothesis is unable to explain the 
strong negative relationship between stock returns and expected and unexpected inflation. 
 
McCarthy, Najand, and Seifert (1990) collected data from the U.S., Germany, and the United 
Kingdom for the period January 1962 to September 1987 to test the proxy hypothesis. Using 
forecasted instead of actual variables and three methods for estimating expected inflation (Time-
series model, random walk model, and weighted average model), the results failed to show a 
significant relationship between forecasted real stock returns and  forecasted real activity. In 
contrast, the negative relationship between expected real stock returns and expected inflation 
persisted even after forecasted real activity was accounted for. In conclusion the authors rejected 
the argument of the proxy hypothesis in which the negative relationship between expected 
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inflation and expected real stock returns is essentially a proxy for the true positive relationship 
between real stock returns and future real activity. The findings are in alignment with the Risk 
Premium Hypothesis. 
 
Najand (1991) examined the Risk Premium Hypothesis as possible explanation for the observed 
negative relationship between common stock returns and inflation. Empirical evidence for U.S., 
United Kingdom, Germany and France showed a significant positive relationship between 
unexpected inflation and the market risk premium for each of the four countries. The findings 
suggested that an increase in uncertain inflation raises the market risk premium, which leads to 
an increase in the required rate of return on stocks and in turn causes stock prices to fall. 
 
Wei and Wong (1992) analyzed the relationship between stock returns and inflation across 
ninteen different industry sectors for the prewar period (1926-1940) and the postwar period 
(1961-1985). The evidences indicated that the Proxy hypothesis failed to explain the negative 
relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation in non-natural resource industries for 
the postwar period. In addition, the inclusion of future real activity failed to eliminate the 
spurious relation between stock returns and unexpected inflation. 
 
Liu, Hsueh and Clayton (1993) tested the three propositions of the Proxy hypothesis: (1) stock 
returns are positively related to expected real activity (2) monetary policy is countercyclical and 
(3) expected inflation increases as a result of an expected increase in money supply. Analysis of 
the data from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada generated a significant 
relation between expected inflation and expected real activity but an insignificant relation 
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between real stock returns and expected real activity. The proposition that monetary policy is 
countercyclical was not supported by the results. In conclusion, the authors argued that the Proxy 
Hypothesis fell short of explaining the negative relation between real stock returns and expected 
inflation.  
 
Najand and Noronha (1998) researched the existence and the direction of causal relationship 
between stock returns, inflation, interest rates, and real activity for Japan using the state space 
procedure from January 1977 to December 1994 period. The results pointed out that (1) inflation 
has negative and significant effect on real stock returns; (2) stock returns are negatively affected 
by an increase in interest rates; (3) inflation and interest rates influence the rate of growth in 
industrial production; (4) this result presents a partial support for Fama’s Proxy hypothesis that 
inflation predicts real activity. 
 
Kyriacou et al. (2006) measured the equity risk premium for ten industrial countries (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and United 
States) over a period of 132 years from 1871 to 2002, and then used a pooled cross-section and 
time-series analysis to investigate the relationship between the equity risk premium and the rate 
of inflation. The results indicated that the equity risk premium has been significantly positively 
related to the rate of inflation. In particular, the equity risk premium increased significantly in 
periods of high inflation rates such as during the two world wars and the two oil price shocks in 
the 1970s. The results presented a strong argument for the Risk Premium Hypothesis that 
uncertainty about monetary policy increases inflation risk, and an unexpected increase in 
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inflation causes the market risk premium to rise, resulting in an increase in the required rate of 
return on stocks. The increase in the required rate of return causes stock prices to fall. 
 
 
MODEL AD VARIABLE COSTRUCTIO 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop a model to study the impact of uncertain inflation on the 
equity risk premium. The model will provide a basis for empirical testing for the impact of 
uncertain inflation on risky assets. The following assumptions are made to derive the model: 
 
(1) Investors are risk averse and aspire to maximize a single period expected utility of 
real terminal wealth. 
(2) Investors have homogenous expectations with respect to the rate of assets returns and 
price changes. 
(3) Returns on assets and price change follow continuous time stochastic (Weiner) 
processes. 
 
The first assumption implies that the individuals’ utility functions are assumed to be strictly 
concave. This implies that: (1) they always prefer more wealth to less (the marginal utility of 
wealth is positive, MU(W)>0), and (2) their marginal utility of wealth decreases as they have 
more and more wealth (dMU(W)/dW<0). Also since all investors maximize the expected utility 
of their end of period wealth, the model is implicitly a one period model. 
The second assumption implies that investors make decisions based on an identical opportunity 
set. In other words, no one can be fooled because everyone has the same information at the same 
time.  
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The last assumption implies that (a) the capital market are assumed to be open all the time, and 
therefore economic agents have the opportunity to trade continuously, (b) asset prices traded in 
speculative markets satisfy the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” of Fama (1970) and Samuelson 
(1965). Namely, assets are priced so that the stochastic processes describing the unanticipated 
parts of their expected value are martingale. The notion that stochastic processes is martingale is 
generally accepted by financial economists (see for example; Fama (1965), Mandelbrot (1966)). 
A martingale is stochastic process (Xi), where for all i = 1,2… 
1. 〈∞|)(| iXE ; and  
2. iii XXXXE =+ ),...,/( 11  
 
This is often called a “fair game” since the expected future value of a variable is equal to its most 
recent realization. In a market characterized by risk averse investors, the martingale model is 
appropriate if the arbitrage profits are to be eliminated. A proof for this proposition is provided 
by Samuelson (1965). Markets characterized by the absence of arbitrage profits are generally 
accepted in the finance literature. If investors are risk averse, the appropriate arbitrage arguments 
deal not with “profits” of expected returns, but rather with expected utility. It is further assumed 
that the asset returns are generated by diffusion processes with continuous sample paths and that 
returns are serially independent and identically distributed through time, i.e., that prices follow a 
geometric Brownian motion or Wiener process, and hence the prices are log normally 
distributed. 
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The general Wiener process x is described by the following stochastic differential equation. This 
equation is often used as a model of the rate of return on stocks. See for example Merton (1973, 
1978), and Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976) among others. 
dx = adt + bdz         (11) 
 
Where ,dtdz ε=  =ε  a standard normal variable with expected value of zero and variance of 1 
and a and b are constants. The process is a Wiener process with drift a and variance b
2
. The 
expected value of dx is adt. The drift, a, is often called the expected instantaneous rate of change 
of x. 
 
Following Fischer (1975), suppose that the rate of inflation is stochastic and the price level is 
described by: 
dzsdtE
dt
dp
πππ +== )(        (12) 
 
Where dtdz ε=  as mentioned before, with ε  a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed 
random variable with zero mean and unit variance, that is, z is a Wiener process. Thus over an 
interval dt, expected inflation is )(πε and its variance is 2πs . Therefore, the standard deviation of 
the Wiener process of price changes )( πs represents uncertain inflation. Substituting for dz, 
equation (12) can be written as: 
 dtsdtE ππεππ += )(        (13) 
 
Similarly, the dynamic of the real return on equity is described as: 
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ssss dzsdtrEr += )(         (14) 
 
where  )( srE  is the expected return on equity per unit of time. Since this research is concerned 
about the effect of uncertain price change on the stock returns, another term should be added to 
equation (14) which reflects this effect. This is permissible, as Merton (1975) points out, as long 
as the added term reflects a specific additional source of uncertainty. 
ππβ dzsdzsdtrEr sssss ++= )(       (15) 
 
In equation (15) ss is the stochastic component of asset returns which is independent of uncertain 
price change, i.e., 0)( =πεε sE  and   
2/),cov( ππβ srss = . Substituting for dz: 
 dtsdzsdtrEr sssss ππεβ++= )(        (16) 
 
In equation (16) sβ  measure the degree of the real stock returns with respect to uncertain price 
changes. 
 
Following Fischer (1975), the return generating process for the risk-free asset is defined as: 
 dtsRr FF )(
2
ππ +−=         (17) 
 
where Fr  is the real return on the risk-free asset and FR  is the nominal return on the risk free 
asset. 
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Next, following Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976), the real wealth dynamic for the investors 
is derived. It should be pointed out that Friend, Landskroner, and Losq derive the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) adjusted for inflation. However, this study derives the effect of uncertain 
inflation on the risk premium. Assuming the investors are rational, they adjust their portfolio 
upon the arrival of new information about any changes in the price level. The real wealth 
dynamic for the kth investor may be written in a stochastic differential equation form: 
 )1(,, dtrdtrWW sskFFktkdttk ττ ++=+       (18) 
 = tksskFFktk WdtrdtrW ,, )( ττ ++   
 
where tkW ,  = the wealth of the kth investor at time t; 
Fr  = the real risk-free rate of return; 
skτ  = the proportion of the wealth invested in stocks by the kth investor; and 
Fkτ = the proportion of the wealth invested in the risk-free rate by the kth investor. 
 
The investor’s budget constraint is defined as: 
1=+ Fksk ττ          (19) 
 
By substituting equation (19) into equation (18), we get: 
 tkFsskFtkdttk WdtrrdtrWW ,,, ])([ −++=+ τ      (20) 
 
Differentiating the expected utility of the final real wealth, dttkW +, , with respect to skτ , the first 
order condition for the maximum is derived. 
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0]))(('[ , =−+ dtrrWuE Fsdttk        (21) 
 
Expanding the marginal utility of real wealth function in a Taylor series about tkW , , equation 
(22) is obtained: 
 ϕ+−+= ++ ))((")(')(' ,,,,, tkdttktktkdttk WWWuWuWu     (22) 
 
where ϕ  is the remaining terms in the Taylor series expansion. Pratt (1964) assumes that second 
order and higher terms are insignificant ( 0=ϕ ). By finding the value of ( ),, tkdttk WW −+  from 
equation (20) and inserting into equation (22) and ignoringϕ , we get: 
 ])()[)((")(')(' ,,,, dtrrdtrWWuWuWu FsskFtktktkdttk −++=+ τ    (23) 
 
By substituting equation (23) into equation (21), 
 0])}()([{)(")()(' ,,, =−−++− dtrrdtrrdtrEWWudtrrEWu FsFsskFtktkFstk τ  (24) 
 
Since dtrrrdtrrdtrE FsFFsF ),cov(])([ −=−  and ,)var(]})[{(
2 dtrrdtrrE FsFs −=−  equation 
(24) becomes: 
  0)var(),cov()(")()(' ,,, =−+−+− dtrrdtrrrWWudtrrEWu FsskFsFtktkFstk τ (25) 
 
Equation (25) can be written in the following form: 
 )var()],[cov()( FsskFsFkFs rrrrrCrrE −+−=− τ      (26) 
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where )}('/)("{ ,,, tktktkk WuWuWC −=  is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.  
 
Following the aggregation method used by Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976), equation (26) 
is aggregated over individual investors according to their proportions of initial wealth to the total 
initial wealth. To derive market equilibrium condition let ∑=Γ tktkk WW ,, /  
and ∑Γ=Ω )/( kk C . By multiplying both sides of equation (26) by kC/Ω  and aggregating over 
all investors, the market equilibrium is derived. 
 )var()],[cov()( FsskFsFFs rrrrrrrE −+−Ω=− τ     (27) 
 
In equation (27), Ω  represents the market price of risk and skτ is the total value of common stock 
to the total value of all assets. Furthermore, it can be shown from return generating functions 
[equation (16) and (17)] that: 
)1(),cov( 2 −=− sFsF srrr βπ        (28) 
and 
 222 )1()var( −+=− ssFs ssrr βπ       (29) 
 
By substituting equation (28) and (29) into (27): 
 ssssFs ssrrE τββπ )]([)(
222 −+Ω=−      (30) 
 
Following Ross (1976), it is assumed that the net supply of the risk-free asset is zero, i.e., 1=sτ ; 
then equation (30) becomes: 
 )]([)( 222 sssFs ssrrE ββπ −+Ω=−       (31) 
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by taking the first derivative of (31) with respect to ,2πs  
 0)][(/)( 22 >−Ω=− ssFs dsrrdE ββπ       (32) 
 
Thus, the risk premium will rise with respect to an increase in uncertain price changes since the 
negative sβ  (the negative relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation) is well 
documented (see Linter (1975), Bodie (1976), Fama and Schwert (1977), among others). 
 
The Fischer equations for stock returns and returns on risk-free assets are: 
 )()()( πERErE ss −=        (33) 
 )()()( πERErE FF −=        (34) 
 
where sR  is the nominal return on stocks and FR  is the nominal return on risk-free rate. 
Subtracting equation (34) from equation (33), 
 ( ) )( FsFs RRErrE −=−        (35) 
 
Thus equation (31) becomes: 
 ))](([)()( 222 πββ ssRRE sssFs −Ω+Ω=−      (36) 
 
Equation (36) states that the equity risk premium is affected by the risk of common stocks which 
is independent of price changes ),( 2ss  the standard deviation of price changes with respect to 
inflation uncertainty )( πs , and the degree of responsiveness of the stock returns with respect to 
91 
 
uncertain price changes ).( sβ  This equation is the basis of my empirical study for measuring the 
effect of uncertain inflation on the market risk premium. 
 
The model developed in this chapter provides an explanation for the effect of uncertain inflation 
on stock returns consisting of the following argument. An increase in uncertain inflation 
increases the market risk premium. This increase in the market risk premium leads to an increase 
in the required rate of return on stocks, which in turn causes the stock prices to decline. 
 
DATA AD ESTIMATIO PROCEDURE  
 
To test for the relationship between the expected ERP and the unexpected inflation a least 
squares regression is run for the following model 
ttt VRSVIFERP 21 αα +=           (37) 
 
Where tERP  is the expected risk premium at time t, tVIF  is the measure of variability of 
uncertain inflation and tVRS  is the measure of variability of stock returns. 1α  is equal to the term 
)]([ 2 ss ββ −Ω  from equation (36), and 2α  is equal to the term Ω  from equation (36). 
 
Equation (37) states that the expected ERP is affected by the variance of price changes with 
respect to inflation uncertainty and the variance of common stocks’ returns. As such, if 1α >0 
then ERP is related to variability of uncertain inflation, and if 2α >0 then ERP is related to 
variability of stocks’ returns. 
92 
 
For estimation purpose, I obtained monthly and quarterly ERP calculated as the difference 
between the returns on the S&P 500 and the TB10 rate. The VRS is the monthly stock market 
volatility index (VIX) measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. VINF is extracted 
from the Michigan Survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of 
Michigan. The survey provides a measure for the volatility of unexpected inflation calculated as 
the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of the observations. Following 
Sinclair (2010), this measure is adopted as a proxy for VINF. Data is monthly, 312 observations, 
for the period 1990 to 2015. Table 15 gives a brief summary of the data. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
Table 15 shows that monthly ERPs are negatively skewed with kurtosis value much larger than 
three (the kurtosis value for normal distribution).  This indicates that ERP has a long left tail with 
peaked (leptokurtic) distribution relative to the normal. VINF and VRS have positive skewness 
and larger than three kurtosis values. This indicates that the two variables have a long right tail 
with peaked distributions relative to the normal. The Jarque-Bera statistics rejects the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution for the three series, the ERP, the VRS, and the VINF.  
 
To determine if any of the variables needs to be transformed before I estimate the model I run an 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check for stationarity. The results of the ADF test, 
presented in table 16, indicate that the ERP and the VRS are stationary at the level, while the 
VINF is nonstationary at the level but stationary at the first difference. Thus, the first difference 
of the volatility of expected inflation (DVINF) is utilized in model’s estimation.  
[Insert Table 16 here] 
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Since expected ERP is not directly observed, the next step is to estimate the expected ERP 
(EERP). The correlogram of ERP which plots the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) is examined to determine a suitable Autoregressive Moving 
Average model (ARMA) for generating EERP. The Autoregressive term (AR) represents the 
dependency among successive observations and the Moving Average term (MA) represents the 
persistence of a random shock from one observation to the other.  Few models are estimated, the 
model with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC) is 
selected after passing certain diagnostic tests that include: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation 
LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the QQ-plots, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity.  
 
Table 17 table provides the results for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Criterion (SC), Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the 
and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity. The results indicate that MA(1) model is the best 
model based on the AIC, SC criteria. A constant term is included in the MA(1) model to account 
for a non-zero mean value. The EERPs are then approximated by the fitted values in the MA(1) 
model. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test and ARCH LM test for 
homoskedasticity indicate no serial correlation and no heteroskedasticity. Jarque-Bera test for 
Normality rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals of all models are normally distributed. 
This is confirmed by the QQ-plots of residuals in figure 7. The residuals QQ-plots do not remain 
straight. 
  [Insert Table 17 here] 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
94 
 
RESULTS  
 
Results for the Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
 
Four Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are run to test for Equation (37). If 1α >0 then 
EERP is related to variability of uncertain inflation, and if 2α >0 then EERP is related to 
variability of stocks’ returns. Four OLS regressions are estimated. OLS1 regress the EERP on the 
difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS2 regress the EERP on the difference of the VINF, the 
lagged difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS3 is identical to OLS1 except that it accounts 
for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a dummy variable that take the 
value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no recession. OLS4 is identical to 
OLS2 except that it accounts for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a 
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no 
recession. This table provides the results the four OLS regression of the EERP on the VINF and 
VRS. The results for the four OLS regressions along with the measure of Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Criterion (SC), the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity, are presented in 
table 18. 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
 
The results from OLS1 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is negative and statistically 
insignificant, while the coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant at one 
percent level. The adjusted R-squared is zero (negative). Based on these results, I conclude that 
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the EERP is not related to variability of uncertain inflation, but related to variability of stocks’ 
returns.  
 
The results from OLS2 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is negative and statistically 
insignificant at the level, and negative and statistically significant at one percent at the lagged 
level. The coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant at one percent level.  
 
The results from OLS3 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is positive and statistically 
insignificant at the level in recession periods, and negative and statistically insignificant at the 
level in non-recession periods. The coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant 
at one percent level in non-recession periods and negative and statistically significant at one 
percent level in recession periods. The adjusted R-squared is positive and equal to 2.4 percent.  
 
The results from OLS4 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is positive but statistically 
insignificant at the level in recession periods. The VIN coefficient is negative and statistically 
insignificant at the lagged level in non-recession periods. The VIN coefficient is negative and 
statistically insignificant at level in periods of non-recession but negative and statistically 
significant at five percent at the lagged level. The coefficient of the VRS is negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level in periods of recessions but positive and statistically 
significant at one percent level in non-recession periods. The adjusted R-squared is positive and 
equal to 4.5 percent.  
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The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC) indicate that OLS4 
represents an improvement in the estimation model for the EERP on the VINF and VRS. The 
Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates that the residuals do not follow a normal distribution and 
are negatively skewed with kurtosis value much larger than three. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM test, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity indicate that the residuals are not 
serially correlated and do not suffer from heteroskedasticity.  
 
COCLUSIO  
 
The relationship between the stock market returns, the unexpected inflation and the market 
volatility have been noticeably studied in the financial literatures. With some authors arguing 
that the relationship between the stock market returns and unexpected inflation is negative, while 
others stating that the relationship is positive. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model to test 
for the relationship between the expected market risk premium, the unexpected inflation 
volatility, and the stock market volatility. The model predicts that the relationship between the 
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is positive as is the 
relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market volatility.  
The testing results for the four regression models indicate that the relationship between the 
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general negative and 
insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. This is a clear indication that the 
stock market fully hedge against inflation in times of recession and in times of economic 
expansion. The results validate the Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama (1981) that the negative 
97 
 
relationship between stock return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship 
between stock return and future real economic variables. 
 
On the other hand, the relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market 
volatility is more ambiguous.  The results of the OLS regressions indicate that the expected 
equity risk premium is positively correlated with the stock market volatility in times of non-
recessionary periods but negatively correlated in times of recessionary periods.  On average a 1 
percent increase in market volatility in times of economic expansion will increase the expected 
equity risk premium by 0.02 percent monthly (0.24 percent annually). While in times of 
recessions, a 1 percent increase in market volatility will decrease the expected equity risk 
premium by 0.012 percent monthly (0.14 percent annually). The results can be explained by the 
fact that investors perceive an increase in market volatility as a sign of a change in the direction 
of economic conditions. During recession periods, an increase in market volatility may be 
recognized as a sign that economic condition are about to improve and therefore investors will 
demand lower risk premiums for their future investments. Whereas in times of economic 
expansion, an increase in market volatility may be recognized as a sign that an economic 
downturn is in the horizon and in the process investors will demand higher risk premiums for 
their future investments.  
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Table 15. Summary Statistics of Monthly Variables Used in Testing the Impact of Stock 
Market Volatility and Unexpected Inflation Volatility on Expected Equity Risk Premium in 
Equation 37 
 
 
Equation (37)   ttt VRSVIFERP 210 ααα ++=  
 
 
This table provides the summary statistics of the monthly variables used for estimating the 
relationship expressed in equation 37 between the expected ERP, the stock market volatility and 
the unexpected inflation volatility. Where ERP is the ERP calculated as the difference between 
the return on the S&P 500 and the TB10 rate, VINF is the unexpected inflation volatility 
measure from the Michigan Survey, and VRS is stock market volatility measured by the VIX 
index provided by the CBOE. 
 
 
Monthly obesrvations for the period 1990M01 to 2015M12 
  RE TB10 ERP VINF VIX 
 Mean 0.008057 0.003943 0.004114 3.909295 19.83422 
 Median 0.0107 0.0039 0.00705 3.7 17.77045 
 Maximum 0.1229 0.0071 0.1205 7 62.63947 
 Minimum -0.202 0.0013 -0.2051 3 10.81762 
 Std. Dev. 0.035485 0.001468 0.035488 0.651841 7.640597 
 Skewness -0.968878 0.101921 -0.952368 1.597127 1.972798 
 Kurtosis 7.656295 2.183393 7.556509 6.713893 9.380319 
 Jarque-Bera 330.6677 9.209194 317.0673 311.9514 731.5907 
 Probability 0 0.010006 0 0 0 
 Sum 2.5139 1.2302 1.2837 1219.7 6188.278 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.391606 0.000671 0.391665 132.143 18155.78 
 Observations 312 312 312 312 312 
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Table 16. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for Unit Root 
 
This table provides the results for the ADF test for unit for the variables ERP, VRS, and VINF. 
The null hypothesis is the variable has a unit root. The results indicate that the ERP and the VRS 
are stationary at the level, while the VINF is nonstationary at the level but stationary at the first 
difference.  
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on ERP 
  t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -13.991 0 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.451214   
 5% level -2.870621  
  10% level -2.571679   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on VRS 
  t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -4.611007 0.0002 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.451351   
 5% level -2.870682  
  10% level -2.571711   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on VINF 
  t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -3.135793 0.025 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.451491   
 5% level -2.870743  
  10% level -2.571744   
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Table 17. ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP  
 
This table provides the results for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Criterion (SC), Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the 
and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity.  
 
  
ARMA Models 
  ERP C AR1 ERP C MA1 ERP C AR1 MA1 ERP C MA1 MA 2 ERP C MA1 MA6 
Akaike info criterion -3.881316 -3.884969 -3.876951 -3.87868 -3.889109 
Schwarz criterion -3.857266 -3.860975 -3.840875 -3.84269 -3.853119 
Log likelihood 605.5447 608.0551 605.8658 608.0741 609.701 
Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.871703 -3.875379 -3.862531 -3.864296 -3.874725 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.982721 2.00299 2.000835 1.998727 1.98393 
  Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
Obs*R-squared 2.432273 0.995529 2.164531 1.341503 0.344962 
Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2964 0.6079 0.3388 0.5113 0.8416 
  Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 
Obs*R-squared 1.140232 1.212228 1.303782 1.272041 1.902875 
Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.2856 0.2709 0.2535 0.2594 0.1678 
  Jarque-Bera  Test for Normality 
Skewness   -0.698576 -0.707161 -0.721969 -0.712996 -0.774414 
Kurtosis   7.340533 7.206851 7.18424 7.186233 6.776177 
Jarque-Bera 269.433 256.0728 253.8903 254.254 216.559 
Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 18. Results for the OLS regressions of  EERP on the VIF and VRS 
 
This table provides the results the four OLS regression of the EERP on the VINF and VRS. 
OLS1 regress the EERP on the difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS2 regress the EERP on 
the difference of the VINF, the lagged difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS3 is identical to 
OLS1 except that it accounts for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a 
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no 
recession. OLS4 is identical to OLS2 except that it accounts for recession periods in the 
estimation sample by introducing a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession 
and the value of 0 if there is no recession. 
 
 
 
The mean equations for OLS regression are: 
For OLS1: EERP = α1 d(VINF) + α2 VRS + ε 
For OLS2: EERP = α1 d(VINF) + α2 d(VINF(-1)) + α3 VRS + ε 
For OLS3: EERP = α1 RECES*d(VINF) + α2 (1-RECES)*d(VINF) + α3 RECES*VRS +  
                               α4 (1-RECES)*VRS + ε 
For OLS4: EERP = α1 RECES*d(VINF) + α2 RECES*d(VINF(-1)) + α3 (1-RECES)*d(VINF) +  
                               α4 (1-RECES)*d(VINF(-1)) + α5 (RECES*VRS) + α6 (1-RECES)*VRS + ε 
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 
α1 -0.000148 -0.000994 0.001440 0.001245 
 (0.900500) (0.415300) (0.345700) (0.428300) 
α2 0.000134 -0.003375 -0.001357 -0.000750 
 (0.000000) (0.005900) (0.399300) (0.642300) 
α3  0.000137 -0.000124 -0.002401 
  (0.000000) (0.005000) (0.151700) 
α4   0.000221 -0.004170 
   (0.000000) (0.011300) 
α5    -0.000120 
    (0.006800) 
α6    0.000219 
    (0.000000) 
R-squared -0.126250 -0.099706 0.023839 0.045276 
Adjusted R-squared -0.129894 -0.106871 0.014300 0.029574 
Akaike info criterion -6.604999 -6.621802 -6.735158 -6.743823 
Schwarz criterion -6.580949 -6.585641 -6.687058 -6.671503 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.798807 1.799869 2.005705 2.009547 
Skewness   -1.057003 -0.963611 -0.293095 -0.298282 
Kurtosis   8.167322 7.728397 6.546408 6.460551 
Jarque-Bera 403.914300 336.762300 167.429900 159.279300 
Probability (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test:         
Prob. Chi-Square(2) (1.000000) (1.000000) (1.000000) (1.000000) 
ARCH Heteroskedasticity Test         
Prob. Chi-Square(1) (0.129600) (0.260100) (0.669200) (0.549900) 
            
Note: P-Value are reported in parentheses    
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Figure 7. QQ-Plots for ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP 
This figures graph the QQ-Plots for ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP 
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CHAPTER IV 
COCLUSIO 
 
The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model both for 
academics and practitioners alike. Nevertheless, the financial literature does not accord much 
attention to the ERP estimation issues (Damodaran, 2015).  Theoretically, the ERP is the return 
on equity in excess of the risk-free rate. Since future equity market returns are not discernible at 
the current time, it is the expected ERP that investors are concerned with. As intuitive as the 
concept of ERP seems, in practice it does present a number of challenges. Among academics, 
there are striking differences to what the ERP value actually is. Values vary from as low as 2 
percent to as high as 13 percent (Welch, 2000). The wide variation in the estimates of the ERP 
could be explained by variation in sample period, variation in variables measurement, and 
variation in measurement techniques. There are three main approaches for estimating the ERP. 
The first and the most widely used among academics and estimation services such as Ibbotson 
Associates is the historical premium approach. It consists of estimating the expected ERP by 
assessing the historical premium of past returns on equities over risk free assets. The second 
approach is a survey based approach that consists of surveying a sample of managers and 
investors about their future expectation for the ERP. The third approach is what Damodaran calls 
the “implied premium” approach, and it consists of estimating the ERP based on the value of 
traded assets today.  
 
In the second chapter I explored four of the most commonly cited models in literature for 
estimating the ERP: the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model (HMRRM), the Dividend 
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Discount Model (DDM), the Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM), and the Sharpe Ratio Model 
(SRM). The results indicate that the estimates of the ERP, both historical and implied, vary 
considerably depending on (a) the variable of choice for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and 
the length of the estimation period; (c) and the estimation method. The DDM and the FCFM 
produce estimates for the implied ERP that are below the historical estimates, while the SRM 
produces implied ERP values that are usually higher than the historical values of the ERP.  
 
The post 2008 financial crisis period produces estimates for the historical ERP that are slightly 
higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates for the FCFM. This result suggests that the 
subprime mortgage crisis may have resulted in market self-correction and in investor re-
evaluation of the risk aversion level. In addition, the implied ERP estimates for the three models 
are more volatile than the historical ERP. In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the 
SRM tend to overshoot the historical ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall 
below the historical level during periods of low stock market volatility.  
 
In conclusion the choice between historical ERP estimates and implied ERP estimates is a 
question of belief. Models for the implied ERP assume that markets are efficient and securities 
are correctly priced. Therefore if one believes in market efficiency then implied ERP is the best 
option for predicting future returns. On the other hand, if one is skeptical about the efficiency 
assumption and believes in market timing then the historical ERP is a better option.       
 
The third chapter explored the relationship between the expected ERP and macroeconomic 
variables. The relationship between the stock market returns, the unexpected inflation and the 
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market volatility have been noticeably studied in the financial literatures. With some authors 
arguing that the relationship between the stock market returns and unexpected inflation is 
negative, while others stating that the relationship is positive. I developed a theoretical model to 
test for the relationship between the expected market risk premium, the unexpected inflation 
volatility, and the stock market volatility. The model predicts that the relationship between the 
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is positive as is the 
relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market volatility.  
 
The testing results for the four regression models indicate that the relationship between the 
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general negative and 
insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. This is a clear indication that the 
stock market fully hedge against inflation in times of recession and in times of economic 
expansion. The results validate the Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama (1981) that the negative 
relationship between stock return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship 
between stock return and future real economic variables. 
 
On the other hand, the relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market 
volatility is more ambiguous.  The results of the OLS regressions indicate that the expected 
equity risk premium is positively correlated with the stock market volatility in times of non-
recessionary periods but negatively correlated in times of recessionary periods.  On average a 1 
percent increase in market volatility in times of economic expansion will increase the expected 
equity risk premium by 0.02 percent monthly (0.24 percent annually). While in times of 
recessions, a 1 percent increase in market volatility will decrease the expected equity risk 
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premium by 0.012 percent monthly (0.14 percent annually). The results can be explained by the 
fact that investors perceive an increase in market volatility as a sign of a change in the direction 
of economic conditions. During recession periods, an increase in market volatility may be 
recognized as a sign that economic condition are about to improve and therefore investors will 
demand lower risk premiums for their future investments. Whereas in times of economic 
expansion, an increase in market volatility may be recognized as a sign that an economic 
downturn is in the horizon and in the process investors will demand higher risk premiums for 
their future investments.  
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